In a bizarre turn of events, as Jayanthi Natarajan resigned as Union Minister of State of Environment and Forests (Independent charge), she has been reportedly replaced by Veerappa Moily[i]. He holds Union Oil and Petroleum Ministry currently and will hold Ministry of Environment and Forests Ministry as an additional charge. Firstly there is issue of conflict of interest there, since projects from Oil and Petroleum ministry also come for environment clearances.

This choice of Veerappa Moily as the new Minister of Environment and Forests is shocking, ironical and unacceptable for many reasons. It seems the leadership of Congress and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) has learnt no lessons from its Delhi election debacle. Mr. Moily’s appointment as Petroleum Minister in place of Jaipal Reddy was widely criticized as a sop to a specific private sector oil company[ii]. While we do not want to compare Mr. Reddy as Petroleum minister with Ms. Natarajan as Environment minister, Mr. Moily’s appointment as Environment Minister seems to cater to similar lobby for hydropower projects and dams.

Let us look at just a few instances to substantiate this.  

Veerappa Moily laid the foundation stone of 85 MW Mawphu Stage II Hydel Project in Meghalaya in September 2012.[iii] The project is to be developed by NEEPCO (North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited). Shockingly Veerappa Moily laid this foundation stone even when the project did not have any of the statutory clearances from the Environment Ministry! This only indicates his callousness towards issues related to people and environment. The project has applied for 1^st stage (Terms of Reference) Clearance only in January 2013 and that too has not been issued so far.

“Moily’s love for Hydels” Even as Hydel Power remains one of the most complex, controversial and problematic sectors with huge impacts on environment, people, downstream impacts, disaster implications, Veerappa Moily has been openly supporting Hydel power projects. He has been reported to have sent a note to the Prime Minister, pushing hydel power and Hydel Power Projects. This has been referred by the media as “Moily’s love for Hydels”.[iv]

Mr. Moily has urged the Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister to “Fast Track” Hydel Projects, and specifically seems to favour NEEPCO and NHPC. NHPC already holds several hydel projects in Arunachal Pradesh including the 2000 MW Lower Subansiri Project which is witnessing possibly the strongest protest in the country from downstream Assam. [v]

In 2011, Veerappa Moily actually wrote to MoEF against expanding boundaries of Pushpagiri Wildlife Sanctuary in Dakshin Kannada.[vi] He wrote that people from affected regions will lose homes and livelihoods. But the region under expansion includes parts of reserved forests. Environmental groups stressed that the pressure against expansion is not coming from people but from the powerful hydel and timber lobby which is causing serious environmental and social impacts in the region.[vii]

Support for controversial Yettinhole Project Mr Moily is staunchly supporting the very controversial Netravathi Diversion project (which is now labelled as Yettinahole Diversion Project, only to mislead people) for his constituency of Chikkaballapur.[viii] He is even asking people of Dakshin Kannada not to oppose the project (he has lost elections from that area more than once). This project has fraudulently tried to escape environmental clearance from the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests. It entails 8 dams inside Western Ghats forest regions, affecting protected areas , a dam at Devaranyadurga which will submerge 1200 hectares of land including nearly 700 hecatres of forests and many villages. The proposal will cost minimum Rs. 100 Billion and is economically as well as technically unviable.[ix]

There is little doubt that Mr. Moily is an incorrect, inappropriate and unacceptable choice for the post of Union Minister of Environment and Forests. The UPA government is only committing blunders after blunders in the face of elections. We urge the UPA leadership to immediately change this decision. It would be in their own interest to do that.

parineeta.dandekar@gmail.com , SANDRP

END NOTES:

PCA Final Order on India-Pakistan Kishanganga Dispute

India asked to increase environmental water releases to 212%;

India’s plea to re-interpret Feb 2013 order rejected;

Both countries asked to expand analysis & practices on e-flows

In a clear set back to Indian government stand, the Final Order of Dec 20, 2013 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)[i] has not only asked India to increase the environmental water flow downstream from the dam at all times to 9 cubic meters per second (Cumecs) from the Indian government proposal of 4.25 cumecs (an increase of 112%), the PCA has also rejected Indian government plea to reconsider or re-interpret the PCA order of Feb 2013 that the 330 MW Kishanganga Hydro Electric Power Project (KHEP) under construction and all other subsequent projects cannot draw down the water level in projects below the dead storage level. (The accompanying maps are from the PCA Award in Feb 2013.)

Kishanganga Hydro Electric Power Project Layout map

The dispute India’s 330 MW KHEP on Kishangana River (known as Neelum in Pakistan) in Jammu and Kashmir plans to divert the water of Kishanganga River to Bonar Nallah, which then flows to Wular lake. The overflow from Wular lake is known as Jhelum river, which then flows to Pakistan and meets Neelum River there. However, upstream from this confluence, Pakistan is building a 980 MW Neelum Jhelum HEP (NJHEP) on Kishanganga river, called Neelum in Pakistan, and diverting the water to Jhelum. Because of the diversion of water by KHEP, Pakistan fears its NJHEP will become unviable and had filed a case against India in Permanent Court of Arbitration, alleging that the KHEP was in violation of the India Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960. As the official website of PCA says, “On May 17, 2010, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan instituted arbitral proceedings against the Republic of India under Paragraph 2(b) of Annexure G to the Indus Waters Treaty 1960. A Court of Arbitration composed of seven members has been constituted pursuant to Annexure G. The Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as Secretariat to the Court of Arbitration pursuant to Paragraph 15(a) of Annexure G. The Court of Arbitration is composed of: Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (Chairman), Sir Franklin Berman KCMG QC, Professor Howard S. Wheater FREng, Professor Lucius Caflisch, Professor Jan Paulsson, Judge Bruno Simma, H.E. Judge Peter Tomka”. On Feb 18, 2013, the Court gave partial award[ii], that resolved most of the issues, except that of the environment flows that India needs to release from KHEP. The Final award of Dec 20, 2013 is about the environment flows.

What India said about Environment flows “India’s experts examined the riverbed profile at 12 sites at one kilometer intervals from the KHEP to the Line of Control. At each site, India estimated the water level for minimum flows from 0 to 3 cumecs (at increments of 1 cumec), at 3.94 cumec, and from 4 to 10 cumecs (at increments of 0.25 cumecs), and replicated each calculation across the 99.99- percent, 90-percent, 75-percent, 50-percent, 25-percent and 10-percent dependable flow values. India’s experts then compared these depths to the minimum depths required by three umbrella species of fish: brown trout, snow trout and Tibetan stone loach. Based on these calculations, India’s experts conclude that: The reach between the dam and the first tributary is the most vulnerable to reductions in flow and the site at 6 km downstream show the 90^th and 99.9^th percentile flows as dropping below the minimum 0.5 m depth specified for brown and snow trout. However, Triplophysa [Tibetan stone loach] would have sufficient depths even with a minimum flow of 2.0 m3/s. Thus, the analysis indicates depths would drop below minimum depth requirements for trout species about 10 percent of the time in the upper 5.7-km reach below the dam. Downstream of this point, contribution of runoff from the tributaries will dilute the effects of the dam on flow regime.” (para 65) Based on this India told the court that even 2 cumecs flow would be sufficient, but they offered to release 4.25 cumecs as required by India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). It is not clear what is the basis for the 4.25 cumecs e-flows as mandated by MoEF.

Pakistan case on Environment FlowsPakistan had presented a more elaborate analysis of environment flow regime. The Award says about the Pakistan case: “In keeping with the DRIFT methodology and based on the predicted response of the indicators to various flow regimes, Pakistan’s experts graded the resultant ecological condition of the Kishenganga/Neelum under the 17 scenarios on a scale from A to F, ranging from pristine to critically modified. The results show that the current baseline condition of the Kishenganga/Neelum at the Line of Control is in low category B (near pristine). Various high release scenarios, for example a 20-cumec minimum flow and above, would maintain the river in category C (moderately modified from natural). Other scenarios, including a 10-cumec minimum flow, would achieve high category D conditions (significantly modified from natural), while a minimum flow of 3.94 cumecs and a maximum diversion scenario would reduce the river to low category D.” (Para 56) Pakistan concludes that between 20 and 40 cumecs flow releases should be required from KHEP. 

Kishanganga Basin Map covering both India and Pakistan

PCA calls India’s analysis Simplistic and unsatisfactory PCA praises Pakistan analysis: “Pakistan has undertaken a far more extensive analysis, attempting to capture complex interactions within the river ecosystem. The Court notes that assessments of this nature are increasingly used by scientists and policymakers to bring a deeper understanding of ecology to bear on the management and development of river systems.152 In contrast, India has carried out a simpler assessment, drawing its conclusions essentially from a single indicator—the habitat available for selected fish species… Nevertheless, for a project of the magnitude of the KHEP, the Court is of the view that an in-depth assessment of the type that Pakistan has attempted for these proceedings is a more appropriate tool for estimating potential changes in the downstream environment… In contrast, the Court is not wholly satisfied that India’s consideration of the water depths available for fish and its associated analysis offer adequate assurances in light of the complexity of the ecosystem in the Kishenganga/Neelum.” (Para 98, 100)

PCA unconvincingly says E-flow of 12 cumecs is required In Para 103-5 the Award concludes, “as the release falls below 12 cumecs, the lowest flows at the Line of Control progressively become the norm for a significant part of the dry season… The Court provisionally concludes that an approach that takes exclusive account of environmental considerations—assessed in the absence of other considerations—would suggest an environmental flow of some 12 cumecs… And if Pakistan’s hydro-electric uses alone were to be taken into account, moderating the KHEP’s effect on the NJHEP might entail even higher releases.” The PCA analysis as to how it reaches this conclusion is not very convincing, since this is protecting only the minimum flows and not looking at the river as an ecosystem that would require a range of flows. While KHEP may be passing occasional surpluses above 9 cumecs E-flow releases beyond what it cannot divert, but considering the 18.35 Million Cubic Meters storage capacity of the 35.48 m high dam and 58.4 cumecs capacity diversion tunnel with 23.7 km length, the quantum of release in most months in all years and almost all months in lean years will only be minimum flow prescribed by PCA.

More unconvincingly, PCA does not adhere to its own conclusions It is even more disturbing is that PCA decides not to adhere to even this 12 cumecs flow. Its reasoning for the same is equally unconvincing when it says that India has right to set up KHEP and also ensure it works effectively. This has already been concluded, but as PCA has itself stated, this right is not absolute and is subject to environment flow requirements. How can this right change the environment flow requirement remains an unanswered question. The second reason given by PCA in not adhering to this E-flow requirement is that according to Indus Treaty, considerations of customary international environmental norms and practices is secondary to the treaty. But that is not at dispute here, how can that again come in the way of determination of environment flow again remains unanswered. The arbitrary assumption that PCA has to recommend a minimum release more than half the minimum monthly release has resulted in recommendation of 9 cumecs (which is 49.1% of average dry season flow in the driest month of January). This assumption itself is  arbitrary and unjustified. The PCA does not state that KHEP will become unviable with environmental flow releases more than 9 cumecs. In this scenario, just assuming that monthly flows should not be less than 50% due to environmental flows is clearly arbitrary, unscientific and unacceptable.

PCA determination of E-flow of 9 cumecs is also unimpressive In Para 113 the Award says, “The most severe winter in the 34-year record used by both India and Pakistan to assess impacts was 1974-75. The Court notes that, based on India’s data, a minimum flow criterion of 9 cumecs at KHEP is a relatively severe criterion with respect to environmental flow, but would nevertheless be sufficient to maintain the natural flows through the December, January, February period of that winter.” Elsewhere PCA says that this flow will not protect even minimum flow in 16% of the time. It is very disappointing to note that there is no scientific reason provided in the PCA award for arriving at the conclusion that why 9 cumecs E-flow would be sufficient.

Implication of 9 cumecs on KHEP generation “Preserving a minimum flow of 9 cumecs would result in a monthly reduction in energy generation at the KHEP of, on average, 19.5 GWh from October to March… On an annual basis, the average reduction in energy generation at the KHEP would be 5.7 percent… The Court’s figures for the net and percentage reduction in energy generation are calculated as against the 4.25-cumec minimum flow ordered by the Indian Ministry of Environment & Forests, which the Court takes as the baseline for its determination and for the purposes of this Award.” (para 114, footnote 165)

PCA uses minimum flows for environmental flow without providing plausible explanation It is strange that throughout the award, PCA uses the word “minimum flow” for environmental flow. It is apparent that PCA knows the difference, but the reasons it gives for this in a footnote (no 151, para 97) is rather lame: “It is only the particular characteristics of the Kishenganga/ Neelum and the fact that low-season flows appear to be the principal drivers of ecological change that permit the Court to discuss environmental flows in terms of a fixed minimum.” This is doing a lot of dis-service to the cause of environmental flows.

PCA fails to mandate the method of E-flow releases One had expected that the PCA would, beside deciding the quantum of flow releases, would also mandate the method of flow releases, including mandating well designed fish ladder and ensuring more regular sediment transport. Even as India considered only three umbrella species, 2 of these species (snow trout and brown trout) migrate in the downstream in winters. Without a fish ladder, these species will be severely affected. The PCA award says what India and Pakistan say about sediment flow, but PCA itself does not say anything about the impact of changing sediment flow on the river ecosystem. One had hoped that PCA would make it clear that India cannot make the E-flow releases through a dam tow power house as India is doing in a number of other projects. One was looking for the PCA assessment of impacts of KHEP on the 12.07 km long downstream river stretch within India, since the stretch beyond Line of Control cannot be healthy if the stretch before is not. One sought for not just the lean season flow, but a range of flow regimes, including daily changing flows in each season[iii]. The changing flood character downstream from KHEP was also expected to be assessed by the PCA as also the issue of safe operation of the project. Unfortunately, there was only disappointment on each of these counts.

There was also an expectation that the PCA would put all the submissions of both parties in public domain.

Indian media misleads the nation The actual PCA award of Dec 20, 2013 is clearly contrary to the message the Indian Media seems to be giving. For example, the front page headline of The Tribune screamed on Dec 22, 2013[iv], Kishenganga: India’s right upheld – Arbitration court rejects Pakistan objection to diversion of water for power by India in J-K (in reality, this was not the PCA decision of Dec 20, 2013, it was the decision of Feb 2013 order. The Indian Express headline[v] on the same day was equally misleading: Kishanganga: Court lets India build, operate as it wants. This again was a decision of Feb 2013, not of Dec 20, 2013. The Times of India only had one-column news buried on page 20, strangely with dateline PTI-Islamabad, saying equally misleadingly[vi]: Kishanganga project gets official nod.

Pakistan Media Pakistan’s newspaper Business Recorder on Sunday said[vii]: Kishanganga: India allowed to divert minimum flow of water: Commissioner. The Pakistan Tribune headline[viii] said: Kishanganga project: Victory claims cloud final arbitration award. They sound closer to the PCA order of Dec 20, 2013. The News headline[ix] was though off the mark:  ICA allows India to construct Kishanganga Dam.

Concluding PCA advise The PCA awards notes that Pakistan’s historical practices does not match with what it was demanding from India in case of KHEP and that India’s own analysis of downstream impacts was too simplistic and unsatisfactory. It has advised both countries to expand their analysis and practices on environment flow regime and has clearly stated that this will not be against their drive for more power generation. This is good in spite of number of disappointments of the PCA award listed above. We hope both countries heed this advice earnestly and at the earliest. We also hope the media in both countries would report this in proper perspective.

Himanshu Thakkar[x], SANDRP

———

Important Extracts from PCA Final Order of Dec 20, 2013

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) based at The Hague
Source: PCA website

India’s argument: “releases from the KHEP will also reduce energy generation at India’s Uri-I and Uri-II projects on the lower Jhelum” (para 43 of PCA order of 201213)

“The average annual loss in energy generation at KHEP is the maximum in 90% Dependable Year (Dry Year) viz. about 16% [with a 10-cumec minimum release] which works out as around 32 MU per cumec… the loss being as high as 80.2% in percentage terms in the month of December corresponding to minimum release of 10 cumec.” (para 44)

“According to India, any minimum flow greater than 4.25 cumecs would seriously compromise the economic viability of the KHEP. Examining a 90-percent dependable (dry) year (on the basis of which the KHEP was designed), India submits that a minimum release of 20 cumecs would render the KHEP inoperable for three months of the year, while Pakistan’s 100-cumec release would prevent the KHEP from operating for 10 months of the year”. (para 46)

“… even this 7.2 cumec scenario would result in the KHEP being able to operate at its design discharge for only four months of the year”. (para 48)

Pakistan: “Pakistan presents its data on environmental concerns through a revised submission based on the DRIFT methodology (“Downstream Implications of Flow Transformation”) employed in its expert submissions earlier in these proceedings.86 This approach endeavours to estimate the effect of changes to the flow regime through the integrated examination of a large number of indicators related to the hydrology, sediments, hydraulics, geomorphology, water quality, vegetation, macroinvertebrates, and fish of the river” (Para 54)

“Pakistan notes that the release of 4.25 cumecs mandated by the Indian Ministry of Environment & Forests “is not supported by any reasoning, either in the October 2012 decision of India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests or in India’s submission.” (para 59)

“Pakistan’s experts further note that “[i]n terms of conditions that the aquatic life would face through their 30 scenarios, DHI predicts maximum depths of questionable validity; DHI predicts velocities that are not subsequently used; and DHI does not predict at all how much wetted river bed would be left for the organisms to live in… According to Pakistan, India’s experts then consider only the survival of three fish species, and only on the basis of undocumented minimum (rather than optimum) depths for each species… They do not specify the habitat needs of any other aquatic organisms. Their conclusions that a minimum depth of 0.5 m for trout and 0.25 m for loach are sufficient for survival are not supported by the data they present. Even if they are, DHI’s targeting of the lowest depths fish were found at, rather than analysing their data to produce optimum depths, is not appropriate and would not promote fish survival… India’s experts then proceed to link “maximum water depths with minimum fish depth requirements” in an approach that Pakistan’s experts consider “obscure, simplistic and misleading.” (Para 60)

India: “In approaching the question of the environmental effects of the KHEP, India first notes that the Indian Ministry of Environment & Forests has fixed a minimum flow of 4.25 cumecs for the KHEP. According to India, this figure was set after a process that considers “all the relevant environmental and socio-economic factors” leading to results that vary from project to project.” (Para 62)

In the view of India’s experts, “[t]he reduction in sediment downstream of the KHEP dam resulting from sediment trapping will be minor,” and in any event “native species have evolved in a dynamic environment, in which they periodically take refuge from high mainstem sediment concentrations by migrating up tributaries.”110 Similarly, India’s experts conclude that because the KHEP has limited pondage and retains water for only a short period of time, “alteration in temperature and its impact becomes negligible.” (Para 64)

On flow regime “India’s experts examined the riverbed profile at 12 sites at one kilometer intervals from the KHEP to the Line of Control. At each site, India estimated the water level for minimum flows from 0 to 3 cumecs (at increments of 1 cumec), at 3.94 cumec, and from 4 to 10 cumecs (at increments of 0.25 cumecs), and replicated each calculation across the 99.99- percent, 90-percent, 75-percent, 50-percent, 25-percent and 10-percent dependable flow values.112 India’s experts then compared these depths to the minimum depths required by three umbrella species of fish: brown trout, snow trout and Tibetan stone loach. Based on these calculations, India’s experts conclude that: The reach between the dam and the first tributary is the most vulnerable to reductions in flow and the site at 6km downstream show the 90th and 99.9th percentile flows as dropping below the minimum 0.5 m depth specified for brown and snow trout. However, Triplophysa [Tibetan stone loach] would have sufficient depths even with a minimum flow of 2.0 m3/s. Thus, the analysis indicates depths would drop below minimum depth requirements for trout species about 10 percent of the time in the upper 5.7-km reach below the dam. Downstream of this point, contribution of runoff from the tributaries will dilute the effects of the dam on flow regime.” (para 65)

“Given these limited effects, India argues that “a minimum flow of 2.0 cumec will suffice to protect the three umbrella species in the stretch down to the LOC [Line of Control].” (para 66)

“[DRIFT] is thus designed as a planning tool, not as a normative instrument.”118 India considers DRIFT to be “inappropriate for the purposes in question here” and considers it significant that DRIFT has not been used extensively in Asia, in light of the importance of local knowledge and expertise in the analytic process” (para 68)

“As Pakistan makes use of a constant minimum flow on its own dams, India views this as the only permissible approach at the KHEP for, in its view, the Treaty limits the obligations on the Parties to “customary practices followed in similar situations” when assessing what measures must reasonably be taken (for instance, with respect to such matters as environmental pollution)… India also submits that anything other than a constant minimum flow would place excessive administrative burdens on India, which would “inevitably require India to respond to Pakistani requests to justify its measurements, calculations and actual releases.” (para 69)

On Monitoring “Pakistan therefore requests an order from the Court that the flow regime be supported by India providing to Pakistan, on a real time basis, (i) daily flow data from gauges recording the inflow into the KHEP reservoir and the outflow below the KHEP dam, as well as (ii) the reservoir level, and (iii) with regular inspections permitted to Pakistan of the gauging stations.” (Para 71)

PCA Purpose for Final Award  “As indicated in paragraphs 455-457 of the Partial Award, the purpose of this Final Award is to fix the precise rate of the minimum flow to be preserved downstream of the KHEP.” (Para 78)

“At the same time, in fixing this minimum flow, the Court must give due regard, in keeping with Paragraph 29 of Annexure G, to the customary international law requirements of avoiding or mitigating trans-boundary harm and of reconciling economic development with the protection of the environment.” (Para 87)

On Pakistan Failure “In now setting a fixed minimum flow, anticipated future agricultural uses would ordinarily feature in the Court’s determination. However, as Pakistan has not submitted even an estimate of the likely scope of such development, much less evidence upon which the Court could rely, the Court is unable to take account of such potential uses” (para 94)

On “minimum” vs “environmental” flow “It is only the particular characteristics of the Kishenganga/Neelum and the fact that low-season flows appear to be the principal drivers of ecological change that permit the Court to discuss environmental flows in terms of a fixed minimum. At the same time, because the Court’s ultimate flow determination is based not solely on the environment, but also on hydro-electric power generation as required under the Treaty, the Court’s decision fixes a “minimum flow.” Insofar as this minimum flow serves to mitigate significant environmental harm, it also serves as an environmental flow without being synonymous with that term.” (footnote 151, para 97)

On Downstream Impact Assessment “Pakistan has undertaken a far more extensive analysis, attempting to capture complex interactions within the river ecosystem. The Court notes that assessments of this nature are increasingly used by scientists and policymakers to bring a deeper understanding of ecology to bear on the management and development of river systems.152 In contrast, India has carried out a simpler assessment, drawing its conclusions essentially from a single indicator—the habitat available for selected fish species… Nevertheless, for a project of the magnitude of the KHEP, the Court is of the view that an in-depth assessment of the type that Pakistan has attempted for these proceedings is a more appropriate tool for estimating potential changes in the downstream environment… In contrast, the Court is not wholly satisfied that India’s consideration of the water depths available for fish and its associated analysis offer adequate assurances in light of the complexity of the ecosystem in the Kishenganga/Neelum.” (Para 98, 100)

Criticism of Pakistan’s practices in Env flows “The Court acknowledges India’s point that the environmental sensitivity that Pakistan urges in these proceedings does not match Pakistan’s own historical practices, where the environmental flow has often been set at a low minimum, apparently using a “rule of thumb” approach.” (Para 101)

PCA advise to both countries “With respect to the information brought to bear on decision-making, however, the Court sees no reason to remain wedded to past practices. On the contrary, more comprehensive and accurate information on the likely impacts of infrastructure projects can only benefit decision-making in both Pakistan and India. The Court urges both Parties to continue or expand their attention to environmental considerations at other projects, including the NJHEP. In the Court’s view, such an approach is consistent with the acute need of both Parties for increased production of hydro-power. Indeed, the Court’s ultimate decision on the minimum flow is informed by a deep awareness of the critical importance (and shortage) of electricity in both India and Pakistan. Meaningful development in this area need not be at odds with careful consideration of environmental effects.” (Para 101)

12 cumecs Flow Regime “For example, based on India’s 1971-2004 10-day flow estimates, under current conditions, a flow of 12 cumecs at the Line of Control represents an exceptional event, with just nine occurrences of lower 10-day flows in 34 years. As the release from the KHEP drops below 12 cumecs, however, this exceptional condition would become more common, rising to 16 percent of the time with a release of 9 cumecs, and 30 percent of the time with an 8-cumec release. In other words, as the release falls below 12 cumecs, the lowest flows at the Line of Control progressively become the norm for a significant part of the dry season… The Court provisionally concludes that an approach that takes exclusive account of environmental considerations—assessed in the absence of other considerations—would suggest an environmental flow of some 12 cumecs… And if Pakistan’s hydro-electric uses alone were to be taken into account, moderating the KHEP’s effect on the NJHEP might entail even higher releases.” (Para 103-5)

Unconvincing reason for variable release regime “Since the Parties’ data indicate that the effect of the KHEP on dry-season flows is the principal determinant of ecological change, the Court sees no reason to consider a percentage or variable release regime… This would, of course, not necessarily be the case with other river conditions, and the Court’s decision in this respect should not be interpreted to equate an environmental flow with a fixed minimum flow. Under other circumstances, in particular where the difficulties of cooperation between the multiple State bureaucracies are not present, the appropriate environmental flow could well involve a regime of variable releases.” (Para 104)

Unconvincing reason for abandoning 12 cumecs flow “First, as India correctly observes,155 the Partial Award accorded priority to the KHEP… The right to operate the KHEP is a right to operate it effectively… In balancing India’s right to operate the KHEP effectively with the needs of the downstream environment, the Court has decided that, on the basis of the evidence currently available, India should have access to at least half of the average flow at the KHEP site during the driest months. In the Court’s view, it would not be in conformity with the Treaty to fix a minimum release above half the minimum monthly average flow for the purpose of avoiding adverse effects on the NJHEP.” (Para 107-109) This is most unconvincing. As PCA order notes in next (Para 110) Para, “The Court’s Partial Award did not make the operation of the KHEP immune from environmental considerations.” Moreover, “recourse to customary international law is conditioned by Paragraph 29 of Annexure G to the Indus Waters Treaty… (thus) this (Indus) Treaty expressly limits the extent to which the Court may have recourse to, and apply, sources of law beyond the Treaty itself.” (para 111)

““States have ‘a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate’ significant harm to the environment when pursuing large-scale construction activities.” In light of this duty, the Court has no difficulty concluding that the requirement of an environmental flow (without prejudice to the level of such flow) is necessary in the application of the Treaty. At the same time,… If customary international law were applied not to circumscribe, but to negate rights expressly granted in the Treaty, this would no longer be “interpretation or application” of the Treaty but the substitution of customary law in place of the Treaty… That Paragraph 29 does not permit.” (Para 112)

“The most severe winter in the 34-year record used by both India and Pakistan to assess impacts was 1974-75. The Court notes that, based on India’s data, a minimum flow criterion of 9 cumecs at KHEP is a relatively severe criterion with respect to environmental flow, but would nevertheless be sufficient to maintain the natural flows through the December, January, February period of that winter.” (para 113)

“However, given the right of India to develop hydropower, and the associated right to operate KHEP effectively, the Court considers that a high category D (‘significantly modified from normal’) represents an appropriate balance between the needs of the environment and India’s rights for power generation.” (footnote 163- para 113)

“For the avoidance of doubt, if at any time the flow in the Kishenganga/Neelum immediately upstream of the KHEP dam is below 9 cumecs, India is only required to release an amount equivalent to 100 percent of the inflow, until such time as the flow upstream of the KHEP dam again exceeds 9 cumecs.” (footnote 166)

Implication of 9 cumecs on KHEP generation “Examining the effect that a 9-cumec minimum would have on the KHEP, the Court notes that this would, on average, accord India 51.9 percent of the flow at the KHEP dam site during the month of January, and that India’s portion of the flow would increase to more than 60 percent in November and February, and well over 75 percent in October and March. Preserving a minimum flow of 9 cumecs would result in a monthly reduction in energy generation at the KHEP of, on average, 19.5 GWh from October to March. Although such a reduction is quite significant—in percentage terms—during the driest month of January, over the dry season as a whole it would amount to a 19.2 percent average reduction in energy generation. On an annual basis, the average reduction in energy generation at the KHEP would be 5.7 percent.” (para 114) “The Court’s figures for the net and percentage reduction in energy generation are calculated as against the 4.25-cumec minimum flow ordered by the Indian Ministry of Environment & Forests, which the Court takes as the baseline for its determination and for the purposes of this Award.” (footnote 165)

Climate change? “Uncertainty is also present in attempts to predict future flow conditions, and the Court is cognizant that flows in the Kishenganga/Neelum may come to differ, perhaps significantly, from the historical record as a result of factors beyond the control of either Party, including climate change.” (para 117)

Review “If, beginning seven years after the diversion of the Kishenganga/Neelum through the KHEP, either Party considers that reconsideration of the Court’s determination of the minimum flow is necessary, it will be entitled to seek such reconsideration through the Permanent Indus Commission and the mechanisms of the Treaty.” (para 119)

Compiled by SANDRP

END NOTES:

Dear Arvind and everyone else at AAP,

It is indeed a historic day in Indian politics and governance as AAP government led by Arvind Kejriwal took oath at Ramlila Ground today(December 28, 2013). It gives and amazing, thrilling feeling and has filled us with joy and hope. It is indeed likely to change the politics of India in fundamental ways. Salutes to all those who made this possible.

As well wishers we are unable to avoid the temptation of writing to AAP about some of the things they can be done in whatever little time that they may be allowed to govern in Delhi.

1. Democratise governance of DJB Delhi Jal Board (DJB) is one of the most non-transparent, non participatory, unaccountable bodies. Longer term agenda would need to institutionalize bottom up democracy in its functioning from mohalla sabha level to the top. In the mean time, you can tame some immediate steps to ensure that there is immediate independent oversight and participation of the Board. The steps suggested in AAP manifesto like putting daily readings of bulk water meters at each step are certainly welcome, but more steps are required in this line regarding the governance of the Board.

2. Stop Supply side projects Delhi as a city is privileged place. As even planning commission has noted, Delhi gets more per capita water than Amsterdam, Paris, Bonn or most other European cities. The amount of water that Delhi gets is sufficient to provide for necessary needs of today and even for all future times. Delhi should not be asking for any more water from new dam projects like the Renuka, Lakhwar and other dams. To move in that direction, DJB can be asked to prepare a plan for next 20 years (as a first step) assuming Delhi wont get any more water than it currently gets. As you are well aware, there will be several components of this plan including: A. Rainwater harvesting B. Plugging leaks C. Instituting Water Audits D. Putting in place functioning water meters at each junction E. Adequate treatment of wastewater F. Reuse and recycle of waste water G. avoiding unnecessary water intensive activities H. Protecting local water bodies I. Ensuring sustainability of flood plains, Ridge and other such ecological spaces J. Ensuring protection of catchments. 

Map of Delhi’s Water Sources

Some of these are elaborated below and all of them can be effectively achieved only with democratic water governance.

DJB should also be asked to get out of the commitment for resources for Renuka and other upstream projects and also need for such projects.

3. Rainwater harvesting Ask DJB to prepare time bound plan to ensure that there are functioning rainwater harvesting and use/ recharge systems in place at: All government buildings, all colleges, all schools, all institutions, all metros, all railway stations, all flyovers, all (over-ground) metro lines, all parks, all malls, all multiplexes, all commercial buildings. Many of the storm water drains can also be used for recharging groundwater where appropriate. This should be time bound and consequences to follow after a reasonable time limit say one year. There should be some credible way of ensuring that these function.

4. Sewage Treatment PlantsDelhi has India’s largest installed capacity of STPs, but none are functioning as per the design in terms of quantity or quality of outputs. Put in place credible governance for these to ensure that they function and make specific officers responsible for these and mechanisms to ensure they face consequences when these STPs do not function. Each plant can immediately have a monitoring committee including AAP or local MLA, media persons, civil society persons and RWA persons. 

There are 18 STPs in Delhi, even though this map shows the location of only 17

5. Decentralisedsewage capacities Where necessary and possible, put in place decentralized STPs using less resources and more environment friendly methods in a time bound manner. All large establishments in any case should have their own STPs and water recycle plans. Additional STP capacity should preferably be decentralized one. DJB should be asked to prepare norms and plans for these.

6. Sewage reuse plans DJB should be asked to prepare a credible sewage reuse and recycle plans so that there is less pressure on fresh water supply and more recycled sewage is used to meet non potable use in the city. 

In addition to the DJB the three wings of the MCD must also in tune with the DMC Act 1957 be re-vested with roles and responsibilities for an efficient sewerage system and management in the city.  

7. Drainage system A functioning drainage system and their maintenance is key part of urban water system and it is good that AAP manifesto has included this. DJB should be ask to put their plan on this in public domain along with the maintenance system and those responsible for it. Connect this too to Mohalla Sabha.

8. Groundwater governance It is well known that Delhi is over using groundwater, 2004 estimates show that this was 70% above the recharge then. The governance of groundwater use is under DJB and this needs to be democratized and only at RWA, mohalla or ward level can there be proper governance, which needs to be put in place urgently, along with more recharge systems. Ask DJB to prepare a ground water map of Delhi along with aquifer map (over longer term) and use it to integrate rainwater harvesting, local water sources and Delhi water supply.

9. 700 lphd free water Equity in water distribution remains a serious issue in the city. On the AAP promise to provide free water to those that are going to use less than 700 litres water per household (or less than 140 lpcd), while intentions of helping ensure those who are using minimum water is good, there are a large number of question marks. We sincerely hope this does not translate into clamour for more water for Delhi from outside sources. Secondly, we hope this does not lead to wastage of water, which would actually mean less water available for those who do not have. This also hinges on functioning household level water meters. Moreover, for comfortable leaving, 140 lpcd is not minimum need, about 50 lpcd would be sufficient. Even this 50 lpcd can be provided at minimum token price of Rs 1 per KL. Those who use higher quantity should be asked to pay for the full water use with some subsidy and those who use more than 140 lpcd should be asked to pay higher than cost price so that there is some revenue generation for cross subsidization for the poor. Water price should include the sewage treatment cost.

The Cost of Delhi’s Water: Protest against Construction of Renuka Dam in Himachal Pradesh

10. Investigate Munak stalemate We have noticed that AAP manifesto talks about ensuring that Delhi gets is water share from Munak based on the money spent. However, one of the reasons Delhi is not getting that water is that Delhi did not enter into an agreement with Haryana before agreeing to provide money for the Munak project. It needs to be investigated why did Delhi agree to spend money on Munak before entering into such legal agreement. AAP govt may consider instituting such an investigation.

11. Yamuna river There is a lot that is required to be done for the Yamuna river, some of which has been highlighted in the AAP manifesto as well.  Some of the steps listed above could help the cause of the river. Some of the addition steps should include: a) Demarcate Yamuna flood plain to ensure there is no more encroachment of the same; b) some of the current encroachments can be asked to vacate the flood plain in time bound manner; c) ensure there is some releases of water from Hathnikund and Wazirabad barrages immediately, ask for a long term plan for the river assuming there will be no more dams in the upstream.

12. Transparency about and reversal of agreements with Degremont, Veolia and other private companies The agreement that DJB has entered into with various private companies on Sonia Vihar, Rithala and other projects and the three water supply zones should be put in public domain and ways found to reverse them where possible.

We know Mr Kejriwal and lot of others at AAP would be familiar with a lot of this since Mr Kejriwal led the successful campaign against water privatisation in Delhi in 2005, and we hope credible steps would be taken up in these directions as soon as possible.

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

Himanshu Thakkar

(ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (http://sandrp.wordpress.com/, http://sandrp.in)

Manoj Misra

(yamunajiye@gmail.com)

Yamuna Jiye Abhiyaan (http://www.peaceinst.org/)

OPEN LETTER TO UPA LEADERSHIP:

Do you know how much Aam people depends on Environment?

Do you understand what is conflict of interest?

Do you at all get the message from Aam people?

Please immediately remove Moily from MoEF if you do!

Dear Dr Manmohan Singh, Mrs Sonia Gandhi and Mr Rahul Gandhi,

On December 21, 2013, Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi said at a FICCI meeting  (see the video of this clip uploaded by Indian National Congress: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URnr8OKTygg),  “Many of you expressed your frustrations with environmental clearances that they are delaying projects unduly. There is excessive administrative and judicial discretion. The loopholes are so big that you can drive a truck through some of them. Environmental and social damage must be avoided, but decisions must also be transparent, timely and fair.”

Mr Rahul Gandhi, you are right. The loopholes are so big in our environmental regulations that one can drive a truck through some of them. However, this is a grand understatement. The loopholes in our environmental regulations are in fact so big that even whole dams, mines, mountains and rivers can be driven through them. You are right that decisions must be transparent, timely and fair. Have you had a look at the official website of environmental clearances (http://environmentclearance.nic.in/) or forest clearances (http://forestsclearance.nic.in/) or CDM clearances (http://www.cdmindia.gov.in/), all under Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (http://envfor.nic.in/)? Please do go through the website and let us know if you manage to get the copy of the latest (timely) clearances (transparency) or understand how the decisions have been arrived at (fair decisions). Your statements, that too at the meeting of industrialists’ vested interest lobby like FICCI, only shows, sir, that you have been so poorly informed about the functioning of MoEF, to put it most charitably.

On the same day of Mr Gandhi’s statement, the Union Minister of State of Environment and Forests (Independent Charge) Mrs Jayanthi Natarajan resigned and the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh handed over the charge of the Environment and Forests portfolio to Union Petroleum Minister Veerappa Moily. From day one in office at Paryavarahan Bhawan, Mr Veerappa Moily has earnestly started to dismantle whatever little and poor environmental regulation exists in this country. This is disastrous for the people and future of India and also for the future of UPA.

The Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh said at his press conference on Jan 3, 2014 (http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/pm-rules-out-third-term-says-he-will-hand-over-baton/303780?pfrom=home-topstories), “There were bottlenecks in terms of timely clearances of the projects from the point of view of environmental-forests clearances.” Mr Prime Minister, this only shows how ill-informed you are (again to put it most charitably) or you choose to be.   To give you just one instance, the Expert Appraisal Committee appointed by your government on River Valley and Hydropower projects have not rejected environment clearance a single project in last seven years (for details see: http://sandrp.in/env_governance/TOR_and_EC_Clearance_status_all_India_Overview_Feb2013.pdf). Even when all of the members of the standing committee of the National Board for Wildlife unanimously rejected Wildlife Clearance to Lower Demwe Dam in Arunachal Pradesh for its disastrous impacts on communities and ecosystems in downstream Assam, Jayanti Natarajan, as the chairperson of the Committee, sanctioned it. On Forest clearance also the story is almost same.  Here in rare event when the statutory Forest Advisory Committee (twice) rejected forest clearance for the 300 MW Alaknanda Badrinath Hydropower project, your minister Mrs Natarajan overturned the FAC decision and gave clearance (it should be clear that we are not writing this in defense of Mrs Natarajan’s tenure at MoEF). In another instance, when FAC said no to Kalu Dam near Mumbai in April 2012, a more pliable FAC was put in place and your party Chief Minister from Maharashtra wrote to FAC to clear it and lo and behold, in April 2013 it was cleared! Mr Prime Minister sir, you yourself have gone ahead and laid foundation stone for the 3000 MW Dibang Hydropower Project in Arunachal Pradesh on January 31, 2008, when the project did not have statutory environment and forest clearances, the project still does not have them, because the basic studies have still not been done. All this only shows how off the mark your statements are.

As we wrote in our blog (http://sandrp.wordpress.com/2013/12/21/veerappa-moily-as-environment-minister-has-the-upa-leadership-learnt-no-lessons-from-aap-experience/) on December 21, 2013, the appointment of Mr Veerappa Moily is most shocking and bizarre, showing that UPA leadership  do not seem to appreciate or understand the extent to which poor people of this country depend on environmental resources including forests, rivers, hills and biodiversity. You all also do not seem to understand the issue of conflict of interest: How can Petroleum minister be given the charge of environment and forests?

The petition on this issue (see: http://www.change.org/en-IN/petitions/government-of-india-the-same-minister-for-oil-and-environment-how-is-that-reasonable) has by now been signed by close to 700 people and more people continue to endorse it, I am writing this on behalf of all of them.

Mr Gandhi, while we agree that the decisions need to be transparent and fair, but they also need to be democratic, well-informed and professional, and that means much better Environmental Impact Assessments, people with understanding of environment at the helm of Appraisal Committees and of course, informed participation and consent of the impacted people in the impact assessment and in decision making too, as also credible compliance mechanism in place. That is one of the key messages that we can get from recent events in India, but it seems to be falling on deaf years.

Among other things, this whole episode highlights poor is the understanding of UPA leadership to the signals that Aam people of this country have been sending. You are ignoring these signals at your own peril.

The least we expect you to do is to remove Mr Veerappa Moily from the post of Minister of Environment and Forests and replace him with a credible person immediately. There is of course a lot more you can do if you are really interested in the well being and future of Aam people and environment of this country.

Yours Sincerely,

Himanshu Thakkar

To: pmosb@pmo.nic.in, manmohan@sansad.nic.in, soniagandhi@sansad.nic.in, chairperson@nac.nic.in, office@rahulgandhi.in

Year-end provides a wonderful opportunity for us to take stock of siatuations. If we look at India’s water sector, the above-average rainfall in 2013 monsoon would mean good agricultural production.

But the water sector as a whole is showing increasing signs of trouble.

Let us take few examples. The most striking crisis of 2013 was the unprecedented flood disaster in Uttarakhand in June where thousands perished. Experts and media called it a man-made disaster with a significant role played by existing and under construction hydropower projects and other unsustainable infrastructure. (SANDRPs Report) The Supreme Court order of Aug 13, 2013 directed the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests to set up a committee to look into the role played by existing and under construction hydropower projects in the disaster and also directed that no further clearance to any hydropower projects be given till further orders. This order was possibly the only hopeful sign since Uttarakhand government, other Himalayan states or the central agencies including NDMA and MoEF, seem to have learnt no lessons from the disaster.

Destroyed Vishnuprayag HEP on Alaknanda . Courtesy: Matu Jan Sangathan

Earlier in 2012-13 we saw triple crisis in Maharashtra in the form of worst drought in 40 years, worst irrigation scam in independent India and agitation against diversion of huge quantity of water from agriculture to non agriculture sector without any participatory process. In Andhra Pradesh too, a massive irrigation scam was exposed by the CAG report. In fact inequity in the distribution of costs and benefits related to water sector project lies at the heart of the bifurcation of the troubled state.

Dry Seena River in Madha in March 2013. Madha has a dense concentration of Sugar Factories. Photo: SANDRP

In Chhattisgarh and downstream Orissa, thermal power plans of massive capacities are going to impact the water situation so fundamentally that big trouble is likely to erupt there, which may impact several other sectors. Madhya Pradesh government is on a big dam building spree in all its river basins, including Narmada, Chambal and also the water scarce Bundelkhand. All of these projects are for canal irrigation when canal irrigation has failed to add any area to the total net irrigation at national level for over two decades now. We could see a new massive irrigation scam in MP in coming years, in addition to agitations and interstate disputes. Gujarat too saw a very bad drought in 2012-13, and there is increasing perception that Gujarat government is by design not building the distribution network to take the Narmada Dam waters to Kutch and Saurashtra, for whom the project was justified and built.

In North East India it is now two years since massive agitation has led to stoppage of work at ongoing 2000 MW Lower Subansiri hydropower project. This is India’s largest under construction hydropower project on which over Rs 5000 crores have been spent without putting in place basic studies or participatory decision making process. Similar fate awaits if the government goes ahead with other hydropower development projects in the region without learning lessons from this episode. During the year, Forest Advisory Committee’s rejection to grant forest clearance to 3000 MW Dibang and 1500 MW Tipaimukh projects in the region was a good sign, so is the stoppage of work at Maphithel dam in Manipur by the National Green Tribunal.

Breathtaking floodplains of the Lohit River, an important tributary of the Brahmaputra, threatened by the 1750 MW Lower Demwe Dam.
Photo: Neeraj Vagholikar

But we have seen no sign of improvement in environment governance. The year saw the questionable appointment of former Coal Secretary as chairman of the Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Committee, by Union Ministry of Environment and Forest. In fact, several of the new appointees in the committee do not have any background in environmental issues. The year also began on the wrong note with the environment clearance to the 620 MW Luhri hydropower project in Himachal Pradesh, designed to destroy the last flowing stretch of SutlejRiver in the state. In April 2013, the Forest Advisory Committee took the most shocking decision of approving the completely unjustifiable Kalu dam for Mumbai Metropolitan Region, without any assessments. The same FAC had rejected the proposal one year back and the reasons for that rejections stand even today.

In Western Ghats, the decision of the Union government of dumping the Western Ghats Expert Ecology Panel Report (Gadgil Report) and instead in principle accepting the-much criticized Kasturirangan committee Report has already led to full blown crisis in Kerala and is threatening to engulf more areas. This crisis was completely avoidable if the MoEF, in stead had used last two years to encourage public education on the need for implementing the Gadgil panel recommendations.

While relatively poorer states like Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Orissa has shown big jump in agriculture growth rates in recent years, these have come at the cost of huge depletion in groundwater levels. As Vijayshankar of Samaj Pragati Sahyog said at a conference in Delhi recently, in Rajasthan, the level of groundwater development (ratio of annual groundwater draft to annual utilizable recharge) increased alarmingly from 59% in 1995 to 135% in 2009, indicating that Rajasthan is now in the overexploited category. Of the 236 blocks in Rajasthan, massive 164 (69%) were in over exploited category in 2009. In Madhya Pradesh, while the state groundwater use has moved from 48 to 56%, about 89 blocks out of total 313 (28%) are using unsafe levels of groundwater.

This fresh news of groundwater depletion in new areas is bad sign in medium and long range. “Over the last four decades, around 84 per cent of the total addition to the net irrigated area has come from groundwater. India is by far the largest and fastest growing consumer of groundwater in the world. But groundwater is being exploited beyond sustainable levels and with an estimated 30 million groundwater structures in play, India may be hurtling towards a serious crisis of groundwater over-extraction and quality deterioration”, said Planning Commission member Mihir Shah at a recent meeting in Delhi. 12^th Five Year Plan has started the new scheme of mapping groundwater aquifers of India, which is a useful step, but we have yet to crack the puzzle of how to regulate groundwater use to ensure its equitable and sustainable use for priority sectors.

The state of our rivers as also the reservoirs and other water infrastructure is deteriorating but our water resources establishment has shown little concern for that. The IIT consortium report on the Ganga River Basin Management Plan is due soon, but if the pathetic interim report is any sign, there is little hope there.

Ganga, completely dry downstream Bhimgouda Barrage, Haridwar Photo: Parineeta, SANDRP

The year 2012 ended with the National Water Resources Council approving the National Water Policy 2012. At the end of 2013 we have yet to see a credible plan in place for implementing the policy provisions. The year saw proposal from Union Ministry of Water Resources for a new Draft National Water Framework Law, Draft River Basin Management Bill and draft National Policy Guidelines for water sharing/ distribution amongst states. None of them have reached finality and all of them are likely to be opposed by states as an encroachment on their constitutional domain. In fact the interstate Mahadayi River conflict has reached a flashpoint with upstream Karnataka and Maharashtra starting dams in the basin without even statutory clearances from the centre or consent from downstream state of Goa.

While all this looks rather bleak, increasing agitations and informed protests all over India on water issues is certainly hopeful sign. More community groups are challenging inadequately done environmental impact assessments, cumulative impact assessments, basin studies, downstream impact assessments, concepts like eflows etc, raising very informed and pertinent questions. Most of these studies have been the monopoly of select, fraudulent EIA agencies. Critical questions indicate that these studies cannot be done excluding local communities, their knowledge and their concerns. Among other hopeful signs include some of the decisions of the National Green Tribunal on Yamuna and other rivers.

The underlying theme of these events is the increasing trend of state in India working for the interest of the corporate interests to the exclusion of people, environment and democracy. It is a challenge for us all to see how to reverse this trend.

The year 2013 also marks the end of the current term of the Union government. While there is little to hope from the two main political parties ruling the centre and the states mentioned above, perhaps the emerging political alternative in Delhi will grow and move in right direction. Let us hope for the best.

 Himanshu Thakkar (http://sandrp.wordpress.com/, http://sandrp.in/)

(An edited version of this was published in January 2014 issue of Civil Society, see: http://www.civilsocietyonline.com/pages/Details.aspx?455)

2013 will remain a memorable year for Maharashtra’s water sector in many ways. The year saw several remarkable events, including country’s the biggest dam scam, a severe drought followed by floods, unprecedented intrastate water conflicts, court rulings in many hues, disaster management preparedness, push for urban and industrial water, etc. These issues have raised a question mark over institutions and governance mechanisms around water in the state. 2013 year has been a crucible of sorts through which the flaws and strengths of prevailing water management in Maharashtra can possibly be assessed. This is an attempt to give an overview of the important water happenings in Maharashtra during this year.

As the year 2012 ended, a White Paper on Irrigation Projects[i] was published by the Water Resources Department (WRD)  Government of Maharashtra after much pressure from civil society and media following colossal corruption charges[ii] against the WRD, and also against the NCP (Nationalist Congress Party) which held the portfolio for more than 11 years. This was looked at primarily as a political move in the ongoing tussle between NCP and Congress. Immediately after its publication, Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar who had resigned over corruption charges in WRD was reinstated, without clearing his name. Modus operandi of the dam scam included pushing and initiating multiple projects, incomplete works, unbelievable and irregular cost escalations post tendering: some to the tune of 300%, favoring a cartel of contractors, poor quality of construction, absence of essential studies like water availability, detailed designs, DPRs, absence of canal networks, etc.  All this culminated into the fact that after spending Rs 70000 crores on irrigation projects in the past 10 years, the actual increase in irrigated area was extremely low.

Poor quality work at Gosekhurd Canals, Vidarbha Photo: Tehelka

The white paper provided a status report of projects under the WRD, the money spent, cost escalations and reasons, status of clearances, etc. As was predicted by many, the white paper has been a white wash. Not only has it presented false information about many projects, it has chosen not to report many controversial projects, and has not given any convincing reasons for delay and cost hikes. It nonchalantly reported illegalities like the on-going work without mandatory Forest and Environmental clearances.

One of the remarkable features of the dam scam and white paper has been that both issues were highlighted and pushed by the civil society and the media and also the CAG report.  Parts of the Dam scam was unearthed after organizations like IAC (India Against Corruption), Shramik Mukti Sangathan, SANDRP, etc. which worked on individual projects, mainly of the Konkan Irrigation Development Corporation (KIDC), strung together evidence to understand the scope and scale of the scam. One of the eloquent voices in this group has been that of Ms Anjali Damaniya, now with the AAP (Aam Aadmi Party), who joined the dots across Maharashtra and collected a body of evidence which irrefutably indicated the massive corruption and problems in the WRD. Equally remarkable was Chief Engineer Vijay Pandhare’s unshaking stand against the functioning of his own department. Not surprisingly, he was deemed as being mentally imbalanced by the Ministers.[iii]

In this entire episode, Chief Minister of Maharashtra and his government succumbed to the pressures of vested interests in the pro dam lobby, losing a golden opportunity to purge the irrigation sector of its collective corruption.

The White paper was followed by the constitution of a Special investigation Team (SIT) in December 2012 under the chairpersonship of Dr. Madhav Chitale, to investigate the corruption charges and to recommend further action to the WRD. Unfortunately, not only did the constitution of the SIT interfere with taking the WRD into the court, the members, including Chitale, are all known for toeing the government line. Chitale is also known for his pro-dam stance. On top of this, the SIT refused to accept any evidence about the scam from anyone outside the WRD. This move was criticized by many, after which the SIT started accepting such submissions. However, many view the constitution only for buying time and diluting and delaying actual strong action which is deserved by the WRD. [iv] This again shows how the Maharashtra government led by Chavan did not understand the issue and did not have the courage to provide transparent governance.

Massive Drought: Monsoon of 2012 had been poor in many regions across Maharashtra. End of 2012 itself saw severe water stress in many regions and increasing conflicts. The situation needed quick appraisal and strong, urgent measures. But the MWRRA (Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority), expressly constituted in 2005 to provide equitable water distribution in the state was busy holding meetings about water rates.[v] By December 2012 live storages of many projects, including Ujani, touched zero. Months that followed saw one of the most severe droughts experienced by Maharashtra. This was dubbed as a drought worse that 1972 by political leaders, to underline the “natural disaster” and escape responsibility. However, SANDRP’s analysis proved that rainfall in 2012 had been more than that of 1972 in almost all of the 17worse drought-affected districts in Maharashtra. This proved that 40 years after 1972 and after spending thousands of crores on dams and institutions, the impact of a drought less severe than that of 1972 was more severe, highlighting the mismanagement of water on a large scale.[vi]

Water released from Bhama Askhed Dam to downstream Ujani, as per High Court orders. Photo: SANDRP

Sugarcane concentrated in the worst drought hit regions There were many reasons behind this situation, including inequitable water allocation, pollution, dam scam, etc. One of the major culprits was wide spread cultivation of water intensive sugarcane, promoted by the politicians and the government. The water use efficiency of Maharashtra’s cane farming is dismally low, as compared to other states like Uttar Pradesh.[vii] Solapur region, worse hit by drought has the maximum concentration of sugar factories (28) and maximum area under sugarcane.[viii] It also includes Union Agricultural Minister’s (Shri Sharad Pawar) constituency of Madha. Water required for cultivating sugarcane on 155 864 ha area under sugarcane in Solapur works out to be 2630 Million Cubic Meters (MCM). This is 1.73 times the live storage capacity of Ujani Dam (Live Storage: 1517 MCM), the largest reservoir in Bhima basin and third largest reservoir of Maharashtra.[ix] All this cane was crushed when drought was at its worst. In regions like Osmanabad, all of the cane over 50,000 ha was crushed when all of the dams in the region were at dead storage! The same drought-hit region was also going to host several new (mostly private) sugar factories. SANDRP analysed the impact of sugarcane on drought and highlighted this at multiple fora[x]. Some, like Rural Minister Dhobale, promised that new factories will not come up in drought regions. But this has not been implemented.

Most of the water of Ujani Dam in Solapur was diverted for sugarcane, without any checks from anyone. As it reached dead storage, drinking water to villages was affected. The High Court, while hearing a case filed by Prabhakar Deshmukh of Solapur ordered in April 2013 that dams upstream Ujani should release water immediately for the downstream Ujani Dam and other areas. The rationale behind water releases to Ujani has been questioned. Importantly, even in the village of Prabhakar Deshmukh, sugar industries continued to crush cane using huge quantity of water every day, even when he was on fast.[xi] The government has been completely ineffective in dealing with this issue.

Marathwada was most severely hit by drought and was also at the receiving end of a complex upstream-downstream water conflict. After commissioning the massive Jayakwadi Dam near Aurangabad in this region, several (more than 11) dams have been built in the upstream Godavari Basin in Nashik and Ahmednagar Districts. These dams have reduced the water flow into Jayakwadi.[xii] In keeping with Section 11 and 12 of MWRRA, All dams within a basin should have approximately same percentage of water in October each year. However, in Godavari, upstream dams held upto 90% water, even when Jayakwadi was at Dead storage. Multiple cases were filed in Aurangabad bench of High Court which twice ordered release of water from upstream dams. How much water of it actually reached Jayakwadi remains an unanswered question.

Thus the year also saw complete ineffectiveness of MWRRA as an institution. It was shamed by the High Court. More than 13 posts, including the chairperson and expert members were not filled for several years and the authority was all together nonfunctional. Rules of the Act were not made 8 years after formulating the act. They were hastily made after HC orders and very significantly, tried to delete the same clauses which were significant for equitable water distribution. This again was and is being contested by civil society, especially in Marathwada. Now, the WRD has appointed a committee under the chairpersonship of Mr. Mendhegiri, Director WALMI, specifically tasked with making MWRRA “practicable”.  Marathwada groups see this as a clear threat to Jayakwadi and have written to the government as well as Mendhegiri Committee. The road ahead seems long.[xiii]

Drought of 2013 was not without bright sparks, though. Collectors from places like Beed, Jalna and Osmanabad took some strong stands. Notable amongst these was Dr. Nagargoze from Osmanabad. Many of their recommendations were however ignored. Civil society groups became active and vocal about equitable water management. Many villages joined initiated desilting tanks and weirs. Several new watershed structures were erected. All this led to considerable storage in 2013 monsoons.

However, quick fix methods like Shirapur pattern which entail deepening and widening of streams and rivulets, was pushed indiscriminately for all, as was string of cement nallah bunds, but this again was contested for its impacts on groundwater and environment. It is now reported that Government has applied for a Rs 60,000 crores loan for drought proofing works, with support from the World Bank. Before such big ticket expenses, we need to check what happened to the thousands of crores spent on watershed management and specifically minor irrigation projects? Large number of minor irrigation projects are dysfunctional and poorly maintained, like their big counterparts. People’s participation in management is the key, but is entirely absent.[xiv] The year 2013 also saw tragic death of five engineers of the WRD, while inspecting a flawed minor irrigation project, which caved in during the inspection.

Unviable LIS also violate laws At the same time, many Lift Irrigation Schemes (LIS) of Maharashtra applied for TOR clearance or Environmental clearances with the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Central Government. SANDRP was following this closely and we were shocked to find that many projects which applied for clearances were already underway, some were nearly finished. All such work before clearance is in complete violation of the Environmental Protection Act 1986 and EIA Notification Sept 2006. All of these projects: Lower Dnyan Ganga, Ar kacheri and Alewadi nalla, Shirpaur Lift Irrigation Scheme and Krishna Marathwada Lift Irrigation scheme were rejected clearance by the MoEF’s Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Projects after SANDRP wrote to the EAC about the violations. Though White paper stated Forest and Environmental clearances as hurdles to its work, we see that projects do not wait for these processes and WRD pushes on with illegal works.

2013 Monsoon 2013 monsoon (June-Sept) has been satisfactory for most of the state: Vidarbha got 1360.4 mm (43% above average) rainfall, Madhya Maharashtra got 880.1 mm (21% above average) rainfall, Konkan got 3502.6 mm (20% above average) rainfall and Marathawada got 747.3 mm (9% above average) rainfall. Thus Vidarbha, already stressed by water diversions for thermal power plants and farmers plight, faced severe floods this year. Standing crops of cotton and soyabean were destroyed and the impacts of soil erosion continue till date. Same is the case with Dhule and Jalgaon districts. Operation of Dams has been held responsible for compounding the flood losses in places like Wardha and Chandrapur. Compensation announced to the farmers is meager, with some receiving single digit checks.

The Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal announced its final verdict in November 2013, disallowing Maharashtra to make any further interbasin transfers, especially through the Krishna Marathwada Lift Irrigation project. The work on this project is already progressed to considerable extent. Mostly, this again will be money down the drain. The project also applied for environment clearance, but was denied that following SANDRP submission that work has already progressed before the clearance.

Western Ghats 2013 also saw a huge upheaval and public discourse surrounding the Western Ghats, following the Western Ghats Expert Ecology Panel (WGEEP) Report by Prof. Madhav Gadgil and the problematic Kasturirangan Committee report, mainly to dilute WGEEP recommendations[xv]. The affidavit submitted by Principal Secretary Maharashtra on the WGEEP report is extremely flawed. Even when SANDRP and other organizations highlighted the gross violations in KIDC irrigation projects, the Forest and Irrigation department continued to ignore that[xvi]. The affidavit[xvii] says that interbasin water transfers in Western Ghats are necessary in Maharashtra for the water security of the drought affected region in the Deccan plateau, but ironically, all the current water transfers of more than 2000 MCM annually though Koyana HEP and TATA HEPs is transferring water FROM this very drought hit region TO the water surplus region of Konkan And this was not checked even when the 2012-13 drought was at its peak and organizations like SANDRP raised this issue during the drought.[xviii]

The dithering ways of Congress government at the centre and state are epitomsed in a recent event of appointing Veerapa Moily, a completely unsuitable candidate[xix], as the Union Environment Minister. One of the first persons Mr. Moily met after becoming the Minister of Environment was Mr. Prithviraj Chavan, along with Kerala CM, with the CMs advocating putting a hold on the ESAs in Western Ghats recommended by the Kasturirangan committee and Mr. Moily promptly obliging. In earlier meetings, which I attended, Mr. Chavan intentionally depicted WGEEP report in incorrect light. This may have something to do with entrenched interests another congress MLA, Narayan Rane, in mining and destructive activities in the Western Ghats of Maharashtra.

Looking at Rahul Gandhi’s absolutely incorrect depiction of Environment and Environmental clearances as hurdles at the FICCI meet, it looks like the congress establishment has just not got the message from the AAP episode in Delhi. People have indicated that they want clean, participatory and responsive governance and not just growth at any cost. The establishment seems to have no clue about the dependence of the poor on the environmental resources.

Dams around Mumbai, in the Western Ghats 2013 saw frenzied activity by the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA) and Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) to push more and more drinking water supply dams in the tribal areas of Western Ghats MMR region. Around 12 dams are now in various stages of completion, construction and planning for the MMR Urban areas. They will together affect more than 100,000 tribals and submerge more than 22,000 hectares of land including over 7000 hectares of forests and protected areas. Looking at options that Mumbai has and its current water management, these dams are totally unjustified. Some dams like Kalu started even before statutory Forest clearance. Balganga dam is 90% complete without land acquisition! In Suseri Dam, the contractor secured permission for a farm house and built a site office instead. SANDRP and other organizations held a workshop focusing on these issues in Mumbai on the 18^th December 2013.[xx]Here too, the fight for sustainable and equitable water management looks tough as the power equation is skewed in favour of the urban areas.

Forests in Tansa Wildlife Sanctuary. 750 hectares of these forests will be submerged for the Gargai Dam. Photo: SANDRP

Significantly, it was at Mr. Chavan’s request letter to Union Environment Minister that Kalu Dam was considered again by the Forest Advisory Committee, MoEF in April 2013 and was given in-principle clearance a month later, after being categorically rejected just one year back. The dam will submerge 1000 hectares of forests in Western Ghats and will affect at least 18000 tribals. Mr. Chavan, in one of his meetings, had said that no project will go ahead without assessing its impact on the environment. I had then publicly reminded him there that no assessment has taken place for Kalu and he himself is pushing it without assessment.

The urban water scenario in Maharashtra is seriously problematic at the moment. Many urban areas are in a hurry to build new dams as the only option to their increasing water supply, but are not ready to harvest rain, or to treat and reuse any sewage they generate or to revive their rivers and other local water sources or achieve any participatory governance. Nashik, which receives additional funds from the National River Conservation Directorate for cleaning up Godavari is converting the river into a drain, while hankering for a new dam called Kikvi. SANDRP raised objections about this proposal and it is yet to receive final Forest Clearance from the MoEF.[xxi] Godavari Gatarikaran Virodhi manch, a civil society group in Nashik has filed 3 petitions against the Municipal Corporation and MIDC for polluting Godavari. The corporation is actually releasing untreated sewage in the river, just a few hundred meters upstream the holy Ramkund in which devotees take a dip and consume teerth, especially during Kumbh Mela.

All in all, 2013 exposed the gaping holes in Maharashtra’s water governance. Events which happened this year are not one-off accidents but underline systemic flaws. Some of the main factors include blind push for big dams, no post facto analysis of existing projects, absence of equitable water distribution, exclusion of communities in decision making and management, absence of transparency and accountability in management and corruption and arrogance linked to powerful vested interests.

As the year 2013 closes, Chief Minister, Union Agriculture Minister and all the dignitaries so very linked with sugar sector again came together at the Vasantdada Sugar Institute’s Annual General Meeting in December 2013. The same leaders had met at the same forum in March 2013 in the middle of the drought, when the Union Agriculture Minister had said that from next year flow irrigation to sugarcane will be stopped and drip will be made compulsory.[xxii]  But just after 9 months from the “worse drought in 40 years”, these promises seem to have been forgotten. The same Minister did not even mention drip in his December 2013 address.

Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar, Maharashtra Chief Minister Prithviraj Chavan, Deputy CM Ajit Pawar at the award presentation ceremony at the 37th Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Vasantdada Sugar Institute (VSI) at Manjri in Pune, Maharashtra. Photo: ePrahaar

In conclusion 2013 ends in India on a historical note, with the Aam Admi Party taking over the reins of the government in Delhi, riding to power on the promise of clean, corruption free, pro-people and hence pro-environment governance. The key operative term here is transparent and democratic governance.

In Maharashtra, Chief Minister Prithviraj Chavan assumed office on a similar promise of clean governance, but the CM and his government has completely lost this claim. It was shocking to see that the Chavan government rejected the Adarsh Scam report hat indicting the ruling Cong and NCP leaders, highlighting the misguided, dishonest and weak governance in the State. Political opposition has also completely failed here. In the dam scam or other episodes described above, neither the BJP, nor the Shiv Sena nor any other party could play an effective pro-people role.

Thus, as far as current political set up in the state is concerned, the writing is clearly on the wall. Rural poor who do not receive irrigation, farmers whose water is stolen by industries, urban poor and the middle class who do not get assured water despite the city spending thousands of crores on water supply projects, rivers which are drying up, they all need alternatives and pro people governance.

Let us hope and work to ensure that 2014 will be a different year. It is a tough road ahead.

Parineeta Dandekar (parineeta.dandekar@gmail.com) ,

with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

END NOTES:

The year 2013 was an important for the water sector of northeastern states of India with several significant events. In this article I have tried to summarize some of the important events, issues and concerns of the water sector in northeast.  

Massive hydropower projects considered and cleared for northeast An analysis done by SANDRP for the year 2013 has showed that massive hydropower capacity in northeast India has been considered and cleared by Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on River valley and Hydroelectric projects. The total installed capacity of considered by EAC for the year 2013 is 29458 MW and out of which 21805 MW (over 74% of 29458 MW) projects are in the northeast India. On the other hand out of the total capacity considered for northeast, 20180 MW (over 92.5% of 21805 MW) projects are in Arunachal Pradesh. The total number of projects considered from northeast for 2013 was 37, all (including the Dibang multipurpose project, which is basically a hydro project) are hydropower projects. Out of these 37 projects, 10 projects of 4917 MW installed capacity has been given TOR (Terms of Reference) clearance or the Stage 1 clearance. 4 projects with 953 MW installed capacity has been given final environment clearances. 13 projects with 9078 MW capacity had been given extension of their TOR validity which implies that in next 2-3 years all these projects would also come up for final environmental clearance.

Pare hydro-power project on Pare/Dikrong river in Arunachal Pradesh is currently under -construction.
Photo – Parag Jyoti Saikia

India-China Water Information Sharing MoU of October 2013 One of the most important developments of the year 2013 was the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding through which it was agreed that the current hydrological data (Water Level, Discharge and Rainfall) in respect of three stations, namely, Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia located on river Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra from 1^st June to 15^th  October every year will now be extended to May 15^th to Oct 15^th with effect from 2014. Another important news through this agreement is that the Government of India recognizes the value of river since the agreement writes “rivers and related natural resources and the environment are assets of immense value to the socio-economic development.” But this agreement has been misread and misreported by a large section of the media. SANDRP wrote a detailed blog “Media Hype Vs Reality: India-China Water Information Sharing MoU of Oct 2013” which clears the fog around this agreement.   The blog also lists formation and decisions of the meetings of the Expert Level Mechanisms (ELM) on Trans-border rivers and MoUs on Hydrological Data Sharing on River Brahmaputra / Yaluzangbu and Satluj / Langquin Zangbu.   

Forest Clearance Rejected for Tipaimukh and Dibang Hydropower Projects In the year 2013 the rejection of forest clearance to 1500 MW Tipaimukh hydropower project and 3000 MW Dibang multipurpose project by the Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) of MoEF is noteworthy. Here it should be noted that the Prime Minister of India laid foundation stone for the Dibang Project in Jan 2008 when the project did not have any of the statutory clearances! However, NHPC has already started lobbying the Prime Minister headed Cabinet Committee on Investments to intervene for the forest clearance for Dibang Project and a note has already been moved for this. We hope these FAC decisions are not reversed as it happened in case of Kalu dam in Maharashtra, where the FAC decision was reversed following a letter from the Chief Minister. The stay over the construction work of Maphithel dam in Manipur by the National Green Tribunal could have been regarded as a positive sign but recent reports suggests that Union Ministry for Tribal Affairs (MOTA) had done a U-turn by going “back on its views to say that the Forest Rights Act should not apply to the acquisition of land from the Tanghkul and Kuki tribal people as a ‘rare and unique’ exception.”[1]

Two years of Anti-dam protests in Assam and Tripartite Talks The protest against large hydropower dams in Arunachal Pradesh had reached a new milestone as the stoppage of construction work of Lower Suabansiri hydropower project completed two year on 16^th December 2013. This stoppage of the construction work of the Lower Subansiri project has brought the issue of downstream impacts of large dams to the forefront and also showed how a mass movement can question a top-down development project. These protests were led by Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS), All Assam Student Union (AASU), Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuba-Chatra Parishad(AJYCP) along with several other organizations.

KMSS president Akhil Gogoi with other members take out a procession in Guwahati on 16th December, 2013. Picture by UB Photos

On Dec 6, 2013, a tripartite discussion was held involving the central government, Government of Assam and experts protesting organizations. Though this meeting failed to come to a common resolution, it led to the expert to expert meeting on the Lower Subansiri dam issues on 22^nd December 2013.

These discussions not only help in building public opinion about the issue but also provide platform to discuss the larger issues related with 168 hydropower dam proposed for Arunachal Pradesh and its cumulative impacts in the larger Brahmaputra basin.

Foreign Funding of Hydropower projects in Northeast In the year 2013 Asian Development Bank has agreed to give loan of $ 200 million to construct the Lower Kopili Hydropower project in Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao districts Assam. This project is being constructed by Assam Power Generation Corporation Limited (APGCL) and it is 8 km downstream of Kopili hydropower project, first dam on Kopili river. It is important to note that acidic contamination of water due to unabated mining in the upstream Meghalaya is a poses a major threat for the viability of the dam and this was disclosed in a study initiated by the project proponent. This project was given TOR clearance in the 69^th meeting of EAC.

Proposed Site for Lower Kopili HEP in Assam.
Photo – Parag Jyoti Saikia

Foreign funding of hydropower project comes with the risk of huge cost overruns. This was evident in the case of Pare HEP on Pare/Dikrong river which NEEPCO constructing taking a loan of 80 million euros from KfW, a German Bank. Incidentally, this project was schedule to be completed in September 2013 but Central Electricity Authority status report on projects under execution now states the completion time as 2015. The cost of this project has already increased by 205% from its initial estimates. The loan amount along with the interest rest is also increasing year by year and NEEPCO’s 36^th Annual Report of 2011-12 states that the loan taken from KfW is “repayable in 30 equal half yearly installments w.e.f. 30.12.2013.” This implies that even before the completion of the project the company has to start paying back the loan.

SANDRP had written a detail blog titled “Lower Kopili HEP: Oustanding issues that must be resolved before EAC can consider the project” which discussed the issues related with the proposed dam including the increase in intensity of floods in downstream Nagaon.  

Assam’s Flood Devastation For Assam, the central state of northeast India, flood is an annual event. In the year 2013 Assam witnessed three waves of flood. The table below provides a glimpse of the extent of the flood disaster Assam faced in 2013. The data is sourced from National Disaster Management Institute under the Ministry of Home Affairs of Government of India. 

Data from NDMI, Government of India

But it was surprising to find that the numbers of affected people and villages provided by a central government organization is much less than the number provided by the disaster management department of the state government. The State Disaster Management Authority of Assam (SDMAA) provides much larger number of affected people. During the monsoon months of 2013, SDMAA published daily flood report on its website. After following the flood reports of four months, the following table with some key dates has been prepared to give an idea of the discrepancy between state government and central government data.

Data from SDMAA, Government of Assam

This discrepancy points towards the lack of the coordination between the state and the central government departments which is clearly not good sign. Floods need serious attention and such misreporting can lead to confusions which will ultimately have bearing on the people of Assam. It is important to mention that many in Assam believe that the problem of flood in Assam has not been dealt adequately by the central government. The discrepancy detailed above reinforces that belief.

False claim about climate induced displacement in Northeast India by a global agency In connection with the flood issue, the year 2013 will also be marked by the publication of the report named “Global Estimates 2012 – People Displaced by Disasters” by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) based in Geneva, Switzerland. This report had stated that the largest climate induced displacement in the world for the year 2012 happened in two states of Northeast India, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh in June 2012 due to the monsoon floods which displaced 6.9 million people, constituting about 21.2% of the population of the two states. But a detailed analysis of this report by SANDPR revealed that the though these figure are highly exaggerated. This analysis is available at “2012 Floods Displaced 6.9 Million in Northeast-IDMC: Staggering but Highly Exaggerated”.

Havoc of Erosion In Assam, along with annual floods, river bank erosion by Brahmaputra and its tributaries is a major cause of concern. The year 2013 is also no exception and severe erosion was reported in several parts of the state. A report Study of Brahmaputra River Erosion and Its Control done by IIT Roorkee, published in 2012 measured the loss of land due to erosion of Brahmaputra for nearly two decades in twelve reaches of the river. The total loss of land on both sides of the river Brahmaputra is mentioned below.

This report, sponsored by National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), was a very descriptive report from the point of information and data about the river Brahmaputra and its tributaries. But an analysis of the report done by SANDRP, found that this report was biased towards structural interventions and hydropower projects and oversimplifies the problem of erosion by identifying ‘sediment overloading’ as the main reason for erosion. This analysis can be found at “NDMA Commissioned IIT Roorkee Study on Brahmaputra River Erosion: A Biased and Structural Solution Oriented Report?”. 

protest against the state governments inactiveness to prevent erosion
Photo: Asomiya Pratidin

The year 2013 also witnessed people in river-rine areas of Assam demanding relief from erosion. On May 21^st 2013, the people of Bahgara Dhunaguri village panchayat in the Lakhimpur district of Assam floated the effigy of State Water Resources Minister Rajib Lochan Pegu in a traditional raft in the Subansiri River in Dhunaguri Baduli Para area. The TMPK units of Dikrong Awanori and East Dikrong joined in this protest. According to the beliefs of Mishing society when someone dies due to unnatural causes, his/her body is floated in a traditional raft in flowing river. People accused that Mr. Pegu had completely failed to perform his duty as a water resource minister and he had not been able to give any relief to the people by preventing flood and erosion. Failing to perform his duty has been regarded as the ‘unnatural death’ of the minister & that was why people floated the effigy of the minster.[2]

With respect to construction and repair of embankments, some serious issues were brought to light in the year 2013. In May 2013, All Assam Water Resources Contractors’ Association revealed that out of the total embankment length of 4473.82 km in Assam, the government had repaired only 1327 km embankment, leaving 3673 km long embankment completely vulnerable to floods.

Parag Jyoti Saikia (meandering1800@gmail.com)

with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar

——————

In the year 2013, SANDRP has written 13 blogs on issues related to North East India. A list of those blogs is given below. SANDRP has also made continuous submissions on dams and basin studies from Northeast to EAC and those submissions are available in our website http://sandrp.in/.

15 January, 2014

To:

Member Secretary,

ArunachalPradeshState Pollution Control Board,

Itanagar.

Sub: Violations in public hearing to be held on Jan 18, 2014 for 1200 MW Kalai – II HEP

Respected Sir,

The Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board (APSPCB) has proposed to conduct a public hearing for the 1200 MW Kalai – II project at Hawai on 18–01–2014. Through this communication we urge you to cancel the public hearing which is illegal for the following reasons.

We would also like to point out that EIA and EMP reports prepared by WAPCOS have not fulfilled a very large number of the TOR (Terms of Reference) that the project was to cover in EIA-EMP as per the TOR clearance given for the project on 9.12.2009. Such EIA-EMP will clearly not be acceptable even from statutory and legal point of view and cannot be basis for a public hearing.  A report on the status of compliance with TOR in EIA and EMP is attached along with a detailed critique of the EIA-EMP report. APSPCB and MoEF should immediately cancel the public hearing and ask the EIA-EMP consultants to comply with the TOR first.

1) Project currently has no valid Scoping (ToR) clearance The 1200 MW Kalai II project was granted Scoping (ToR) clearance on 9-12-2009 by the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF). As per MoEF Office Memorandum (OM) dated 22-3-2010 the validity of Scoping (ToR) clearances granted for carrying out pre-construction activities is four years and therefore the clearance for Kalai II has expired on 8- 12-2013.

Hence the public notice dated 13-12-2013 issued by the APSPCB in the Arunachal Times dated 14 – 12 – 2013 for conduct of public hearing (a pre-construction activity) is illegal as the project did not  have valid Scoping / ToR clearance on those dates. Such a notice can only be issued if there is a valid Scoping clearance for carrying out pre-construction activities which is also placed in the public domain, which is not the case till date.

We have noticed that the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on River Valley & Hydroelectric projects discussed the issue of extension of Scoping clearance for the 1200 MW Kalai II project and recommended extension in its December 10-11 2013 meeting. However, an order granting fresh Scoping clearance for an additional year has not been issued by the MoEF, which is the concerned regulatory authority. A perusal of the MoEF website till today (11-01-2014) shows that the Scoping clearance order available for the 1200 MW Kalai II project is only the original one dated 9-12- 2009 (which has expired on 8–12–2013) and no additional/fresh Scoping clearance is available.

In such a scenario, both the announcement and conduct of the public hearing on January 18^th, 2014 is illegal, as no clearance existed on the date of public notice. It is only after the MoEF issues a fresh Scoping clearance for pre-construction activities to the 1200 MW Kalai II project (which is also placed in the public domain) can the APSPCB announce and conduct a public hearing (with no less than 30 days notice).

Hence we urge you to immediately cancel the public hearing announced for the 1200 MW Kalai II project proposed for 18-1-2014. Please note that issue of fresh Scoping clearance for preconstruction activities by MoEF between now and 18-1-2014 will still render the conduct of public hearing on 18–1-2014 illegal. Fresh notice will require to be issued after MoEF issues a fresh Scoping clearance with at least 30 days notice.

2. Law does not provide powers to MoEF to provide back dated extensions There is no provision in the EIA notification of Sept 2006 that could empower MoEF to provide back dated ToR clearances. Hence since MoEF has not issued any extension of the ToR to the Kalai II HEP before 8-12-2013 when the earlier ToR clearance expired, no extension of the ToR clearance can now be issued by MoEF and the project proponent will need to apply afresh for stage I or ToR clearance for the project. This will also be in fitness of things considering that WAPCOS is the consultant for the EIA for Kalai II HEP and we had written to the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh (twice) and to the Union Minister of Environment and Forests that an EIA done by the WAPCOS will not be acceptable. We reiterate that stand and suggest that the fresh EIA should be awarded to a credible independent agency and any study by WAPCOS will not be acceptable, both due to its poor track record and also due to the conflict of interest involved in the governance (WAPCOS is an agency under Union Ministry of Water Resources which is largely functioning as a lobby for large river valley projects) and functioning of WAPCOS (as business model of WAPCOS also involves doing pre-feasibility, feasibility and Detailed Project Reports.

3. Non availability of Cumulative Impact Study Non availability of cumulative impact study of all the hydropower projects (including Kalai II) in the Lohit River Basin in the designated places 30 days before pubic hearing is another reason for the lack of legal backing for the public hearing. As per section 9.4 of form I of the EIA notification, it is necessary for the project proponents to provide information about cumulative impacts of the project along with other projects in the river basin. In the case of Kalai II, it would be cumulative impacts for all the hydropower projects in the LohitRiver Basin. However, a cumulative impact study of Lohit basin is available. Hence the public hearing proposed on Jan 18, 2014 is illegal. 

Breathtaking floodplains of the Lohit River, an important tributary of the Brahmaputra, threatened by the 1750 MW Lower Demwe Dam.
Photo: Neeraj Vagholikar

4. ToR of Kalai II not fulfilled As per the scoping Terms of Reference clearance issued to the 1200 MW Kalai II project on Dec 9, 2009, one of the objectives is to “perform a rigorous assessment of the significance of the bio-physical, socio-cultural and cumulative effects of the project.” However, the EIA of the project now available does not fulfill this (and a number of other TORs) and hence public hearing cannot be held without fulfilling the TORs.

5. MoEF OM stands violated Further, the MoEF vide Office Memorandum dated May 28, 2013 has stated that it will assess projects based on cumulative impact assessment studies. A LohitRiver Basin study has been commissioned by EAC/ MoEF to study the cumulative impacts of all the projects in the LohitRiver Basin (including Kalai II HEP). Although the draft report of this study is supposed to have been completed, it has not been approved by the Expert Appraisal Committee and thus and approved study is not available and such an approved study has also not been placed with the individual impact assessment study of the 1200 MW Kalai II project at all the designated places (DC office, etc) 30 days prior to public hearing. Thus public hearing for the project will also be in violation of the MoEF OM of May 28, 2013. This is one more strong ground for rendering the current announcement of the public hearing on 18-1-2014 as illegal.

6. Lessons from Uttarakhand Disaster for June 2013 The Uttarakhand flood disaster of June 2013 and the Supreme Court order of Aug 13, 2013 underscore the need for learning lessons from the disaster and also doing advance and credible cumulative impact assessment of the projects and also assessment of disaster potential and how the large number of projects impact the disaster potential of the area. However, this has not been done as part of the EIA for the project or otherwise and hence conducting a public hearing without such a study will not be prudent or proper.

7. Options Assessment not done Experience has shown that Anjaw district has huge potential of sub MW capacity micro hydro projects and these are sufficient for taking care of the power needs of the district, state and region. However, taking up the public hearing without doing such assessment will be clearly violation of EIA notification as such exercise is necessary part of EIA and this has not been done for Kalai II HEP.

8. Downstream Impacts not assessed, downstream consultations not done Downstream impacts of hydropower projects have proved to be huge and this is a very important and sensitive issue as is evident from the situation with respect of Lower Subansiri HEP in Assam where the project has been stopped for over two years now. In case of Kalai II HEP, comprehensive assessment of downstream impact assessment has not been done, nor has there been public consultations organized in downstream areas, nor has there been any public consultations for the Basin study in Anjaw or downstream areas. Without all these, the project public consultation will neither be useful nor legally valid.

9. Full EIA-EMP not available in local languages The full EIA-EMP or even proper executive summary of the EIA-EMP or the basin study is not available in local languages and also to all the gram sabhas in the affected region a month in advance of the public hearing. Holding public hearing in absence of these will clearly not be valid or proper.

Hoping for the prompt action in this respect from APSPCB to cancel the illegal public hearing for the 1200 MW Kalai II HEP. A failure to take action in this respect will lead to protests and legal action at the appropriate stage.

Yours sincerely,

Himanshu Thakkar and Parag Jyoti Saikia

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), Delhi

Copy to:

1. Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw district, Arunachal Pradesh

2. Shri Alok Perti, Chairman, Shri B B Barman, Member Secretary, and all the members of the Expert Appraisal Committee on River Valley Projects, MoEF

The 1200 MW Kalai II HEP located on LohitRiver in Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh is being developed by Kalai Power Private Limited (KPPL), which is the Special Purpose Vehicle of Reliance Power Limited. The company had signed the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh on 2-Mar-09. The EIA consultant for the project is WAPCOS. The project was recommended for scoping clearance in 31^st Meeting of Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) held on 21-22 October 2009. The project was considered in the 70^th EAC meeting on 10-11 Dec 2013 for extension of TOR validity. The advertisement published in Arunachal Times suggests the date as 18^th January 2014.

The EIA study cannot clearly state whether Kalai II is a storage project or a run of the river project. The EIA study is also not clear about the height of the dam. Detail analysis of the EIA study reveals that the study is incomplete, inadequate and shoddy. The study cannot qualify to be called an EIA study.

It is also important to note that EIA and EMP reports prepared by WAPCOS have not fulfilled a very large number of the TOR (Terms of Reference) that the project was to cover in EIA-EMP as per the TOR clearance given for the project on 9.12.2009. Such EIA-EMP will clearly not be acceptable even from statutory and legal point of view and cannot be basis for a public hearing. A report on the status of compliance with TOR in EIA and EMP is available here – http://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/01/15/eia-emp-of-kalai-ii-hydropower-project-doesnt-comply-with-its-terms-of-reference/. Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board (APSPCB) and MoEF should immediately cancel the public hearing and ask the EIA-EMP consultants to comply with the TOR first. A letter sent to APSPCB in this regard can be found here - http://sandrp.wordpress.com/2014/01/15/letter-to-apspcb-public-hearing-for-kalai-ii-hep-to-be-held-violating-the-norms/.

Issues Related with EIA consultant WAPCOS

Cumulative Impacts Assessment Study of Lohit Basin Prepared by WAPCOS is Farce The local people from Lohit basin have categorically stated that the cumulative impact assessment study done for the Lohit basin by WAPCOS is farce. In a news published in Arunachal Times (available in Annexure I) people have stated “Water and Power Consultancy Services (WAPCOS) had earlier conducted a cumulative impact assessment of various hydropower projects in the entire Lohit river basin, as per the directives of MoEF. WAPCOS made a farce report, completing within 2-3 weeks. The study is very poor and shoddy…..” Now for the Kalai II project the same organization is preparing the EIA report. From the track record of WAPCOS and from the experiences of the people in the Lohit basin, it is clear that an EIA prepared by WAPCOS cannot at be accepted as a complete, unbiased study.

People of Lohit Basin will not Accept Studies done by WAPCOS It is important to note that people of Lohit basin have already expressed their anger and disbelief on studies done by WAPCOS. In a letter written to the Union Minister on Environment and Forests on 15 march 2012 the, Peoples Forum For Project Affected Family (PFPAF) had clearly stated the following “….no study of WAPCOS would be acceptable to the people of the Lohit Valley and other social and environment conscious people for two main reasons. Firstly, WAPCOS is an organisation under the Union Water Resources Ministry, and Union Water Resources Ministry is basically a pro dam lobby. WAPCOS also does other pro dam studies like the feasibility reports and Detailed Project Reports for Big dams, such studies are done in favour of Big dams and an organisation that is doing such business cannot be entrusted to do an environment or cumulative impact assessment study. Secondly, WAPCOS also has had very poor track record and has done very poor quality EIA and CIA reports. Hence, in future, we will not accept any reports done by such organisations.”

It is important to note that when the people of the whole Lohit basin had raised objections against WAPCOS, the government and companies should not have hired WAPCOS the project consultant. This indicates a hidden strategy on the part of the project authorities to employ only pro-dam EIA consultants to get favourable outcomes. 

Location of Kalai II HEP. Source: EIA report

Critique of the Kalai II EIA study

Biased EIA An EIA report should be an unbiased assessment of impacts of the project. The EIA report of Kalai II HEP is a biased towards hydropower, as can be seen from what has been written in section 1.3, page 1-3: “In Arunachal Pradesh so far a capacity of 423.5 MW has been developed which is just 0.84 % of the total potential. Hydro projects of about 2600 MW are being constructed which is about 5.17 % of the total potential. It is evident from the above that the capacity developed and under development will be achieved for 3023.5 MW in very near future, still leaving behind a potential of about 47304.5 MW (93.99%).” This shows clear towards hydropower project and this EIA report of Kalai II HEP prepared by WAPCOS cannot be considered a neutral assessment of impacts of the project.

EIA does not mention Maximum Water Level of the reservoir The EIA study does not mention the Maximum Water Level of the reservoir when the dam passes peak flood. It only mentions the FRL as 904.80 m.

Large Submergence Area The area which Kalai II project will submerge is very large considering that it is RoR project. The EIA document in Section 6.4 mentioned “The construction of a 198 m high concrete gravity dam shall create a reservoir of area approx. 640 Ha at FRL of El.904.8m. The reservoir will extend up to 15 km along the river Lohit. The reservoir width shall range from about 600 m to 1000 m over most of its length.” But news report published Arunachal Times states that submergence route extends upto 23 km upstream. The report also stated that the project will submerge the entire Hawai circle and all the major villages directly affecting 1500 people.

It is important to note here is that size of the total area required, the number of affected villages and population mentioned in this EIA is much higher than the numbers mentioned for the project when it was considered for TOR clearance in EAC on 21.10.2009. The minutes of that EAC for Kalai II stated that Total land requirement is 830 ha, which has now grown by 32.5% to 1100 ha (Section 2.2 of EIA), No of affected villages has grown from four villages to 25 (525% increase), No of PAFs has grown from 22 to 595 (2605% increase) and no of affected people has grown from 122 to 2279 (1768% increase). This means that the impacts were grossly understated at scoping stage. Is such gross and deliberate understatement acceptable?

Huge land requirement not justified The project claims to require 1100 ha of land, 370 ha more than the land requirement of 830 ha stated at the time of scoping. This land demand seems unjustified and inflated and cannot be accepted at face value. The EIA does not even attempt to look into this issue.

EIA under estimates the number of affected population Even though the EIA has stated 595 as PAFs it still seems a hugely under stated number of affected families. The report claims that their survey team contacted a total of 595 PAFs where the total population of the project affected area is stated as 2279. But the detailed news report of Arunachal Times says that the project will submerge the entire Hawai circle and all the major villages. If this is true then the project will affect much larger no of people.

It is also relevant to note that even as the Kalai II project will affect 595 families (according to the EIA) in order to generate electricity, 565 families or 91.6% project affected families already have electricity supply. (EIA report page 9-13)

Submergence of the existing national highway: Impacts of alternative road not assessed The reservoir of Kalai II HEP will submerge 16 km of existing national highway. The border roads organization will construct two lane road at a higher elevation in place of this. The construction of this alternative road will imply land use, more social impacts, more blasting and other construction related activities, but these impacts have not been included in the EIA.

The alternative highway is planned to be constructed at elevation 910 m. However, since MWL is not given and also backwater effect, which will be higher than MWL at times of peak flood, it is not clear if the alternative elevation would be affected by back water effect.

Many Maps are not readable The project layout map at Figure-2.1 is not legible. The map is very small and except title none of the other details or legends are legible. The EIA must provide a detailed layout map for the Kalai II HEP. The same is case with Geological Plan of Reservoir Area map (Fig 6.1 and 6.2) which are two very important maps but they are not at all legible.

In most places the project consultant have used unclear maps. e.g. ‘Fig 7.7 – Water Sampling location map’ or ‘Fig 8.1 Terrestrial Ecological sampling location map’. An EIA with such illegible maps cannot be acceptable.

Impacts on Migratory Fish Construction of Kalai HEP II will have devastating impacts on fish in the river. The path of the migratory fish will be blocked and this has been accepted by the EIA as well – “The dam construction activities will also create a problem for migratory fish species (Tor tor and Tor putitora).” (Page 8-38). The two species of Mahseer, Tor tor and Tor putitora, locally known as Ngorika and Ngauch respectively and have been listed as ‘endangered’ in IUCN list. But it is surprising to see that EIA opining that “These migratory fish species may move into the small tributaries of LohitRiver.” It is no clear what is the basis of this statement by WAPCOS, it does not seem to show sufficient ecological literacy. The EIA prepared by WAPCOS also seem to ignore that several dams have been proposed in the tributaries as well. The EIA also does not say how well the area has been studied and what kind of biodiversity we may be losing.

Wrong claims about reservoir water quality The EIA says about reservoir water quality, “The proposed project is envisaged as a runoff the river scheme, with significant diurnal variations in reservoir water level. In such a scenario, significant re-aeration from natural atmosphere takes place, which maintains Dissolved Oxygen in the water body. Thus, in the proposed project, no significant reduction in D.O. level in reservoir water is anticipated.” This conclusion is clearly wrong. The EIA says about the reservoir: “The Gross and diurnal Storage of the Kalai-II reservoir are 318.8 M cum and 29.76 M cum with FRL at El 904.80 m and MDDL at El 900.00 m respectively”. This means that 93.35% of the reservoir is dead storage and only 6.65% of the reservoir capacity acts as live storage. Such a large quantity of dead storage will have huge impact on the water quality and the claim to the otherwise by the EIA is clearly wrong and misleading. Similarly the EIA claim of no Eutrophication risk due to “significant diurnal variations in reservoir water level” is clearly wrong.

No Options Assessment The EIA of Kalai II HEP does not do any options assessment. The EIA religiously focuses on the construction of 1200 MW project without mentioning the fact that successful sub-megawatt capacity hydropower projects (Less than 1 MW) are operational in Anjaw district (see Annexure II).

Conversion of community land into forest land can have negative impacts on the communities The EIA on page 10-25 states, “The total land requirement for the project, is 1100 ha. The entire land is considered as forest land. A part of the community land also includes forest land as well. For EMP purposes, the entire quantity of land has been considered as the forest land.” This can lead to severe impacts on the communities.

Here it is important note the implications of actions of similar nature on the Meyor community in the Kithibo area of Anjaw district, in the upstream of Kalai II HEP. A news published by Asian Human Rights Commission (see Annexure III) reports, “The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has received information from civil society groups regarding death threats, arbitrary detention and harassment of members of the Meyor community, a group of indigenous people in Arunachal Pradesh. They are being targeted for their activities on conservation of community land and natural resources.” The leaders of the community reported to have “protested the conversion of the community forest land of Walong and Kibitho area into reserved forest land because it was carried out without the free, prior and informed consent of the Meyor community.” It is important to note that this report also mentioned about impact of dams and other development activities on tribal ethnic communities. However, the EIA is silent on these aspects.

Cumulative impact migrant population in Lohit valley can be catastrophic The Kalai II project EIA states that the maximum number of people coming from outside the region for construction will be 3000 and the impacts are predicted to be only in the construction phase. Here it is important note that the number of outside workers provided by EIAs have proved to be gross under-estimates. But the EIA here does not mention anything about the cumulative impacts of migrant population for other projects along with Kalai II. In fact in a letter written to the Minister of Environment and Forests by the PFPAF, it was mentioned that the whole area of Lohit valley is inhabited by tribal population. The total tribal population as according to 2011 census is 16500. The cumulative number of migrant workers will clearly surpass this population figure, leading to severe impacts on the people of the area.

Lohit river in Anjaw district.
Source: EIA report

Disaster Management Plans do not mention about seismic risks Discussing the disaster management plan for the dam, the EIA study mentions only few issues and ignores the issue of earthquakes: “However, in the eventuality of dam failures in rare conditions, catastrophic condition of flooding may occur in the downstream area resulting in huge loss to human life and property. Floods resulting from the failure of constructed dams have also produced some of the most devastating disasters of the last two centuries. Major causes of failures identified by Costa are overtopping due to inadequate spillway capacity (34 percent), foundation defects (30 percent), and piping and seepage (28 percent).”

The EIA does not include the following important assessments:

a. Assessment of impacts of quarrying on the river bed and river banks The Kalai II project will require 72.6 lac cumec boulders for construction of the project and all of these will be extracted from the river bed and river banks.

Even though the EIA itself mentions how the removing of boulders and gravel from the river bed will affect spawning areas of fishes (page 10-29), but does not suggest for any detail impacts assessment. It limits itself by stating about adequate precautions during dredging period. But it is highly doubtful that any of those precautions will be followed when actual dredging will be done to extract lakh cumecs of construction material when there are no specific steps or mechanisms suggested. Without full assessment and management plan, the EIA cannot be considered adequate.  

b. Assessment of impacts of blasting for tunneling and other works in the pristine and fragile hill range – Blasting in the fragile hill ranges of Arunachal can have severe impacts, especially in increasing the probability of landslides. In Such circumstances, the EIA stating that no major impacts of blasting are envisaged at the ground level is wrong and puts a big question mark on the EIA.

c. Impact of the project on disaster potential of the area has not been assessed.

d. Impacts of peaking power operation on hydrological regime, biodiversity, and life & livelihoods of people

e. Impact of flushing out of silt from the reservoir

f. Impacts of climate change on the project and project’s impacts on local climate

g. There is no assessment of the value of the river that will be destroyed by submergence in the upstream and drying up and changed hydrology in the downstream.

h. The EIA has not properly assessed the downstream impacts of the project. It may be recalled that the ongoing massive agitation in Assam against such impacts of the under construction 2000 MW Lower Subansiri HEP, that has led to stoppage of work there since Dec 2011 is focused on downstream impacts and this project will face the same fate if this is not attended to.

i. No public consultations in Assam Linked to the above issue is the need for public consultations in downstream Assam about this and all other Lohit basin projects, without which there will be no question of public acceptability of the project and the project may face the same fate as that of Lower Subansiri HEP.

Doubtful, contradictory and sweeping statements in EIA The EIA at several places have stated made such statements:

Page 10 -23, para 4: “The construction of the dam would form the reservoir which will submerge about 640 ha of area in upstream. The area witnessed jhum/shift cultivation practiced by local inhabitants. Submergence of the area would not impact much on the prevailing land use pattern.”

This is clearly wrong, since jhum cultivation is one of the key livelihood supporting activity in these areas and if such land is submerged, it will have major impacts on the land use pattern.

Page 10 – 30, para 3: “As a result, barring for monsoon season, (May to September), the river Lohit will have dry periods for few hours for generation of peaking power.”

The idea of ‘few hours’ a complete misnomer and misleading, it will happen daily for 15-20 hours. In the analysis of Lohit basin study SANDRP had found that for Kalai II, “In lean season river water will be stored for a period of 15-20 hours. As a result, downstream stretch of river from the dam site will remain dry for that period. This will be followed by a continuous flow of 1112.27 cumecs (rated discharge) for a period of 4 to 9 hours.” (Lohit Basin Study by WAPCOS: A mockery of e-flows and cumulative impacts – http://sandrp.in/rivers/Lohit_Basin_Study_by_WAPCOS_A_mockery_of_e-flows_and_cumulative_impacts.pdf)

Parag Jyoti Saikia (meandering1800@gmail.com)

with inputs from Himanshu Thakkar  

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Annexure I

Villagers block road demanding scrapping of Kalai II dam

Link : http://www.arunachaltimes.in/wordpress/2012/06/06/villagers-block-road-demanding-scrapping-of-kalai-ii-dam/

Raju Mimi

HAWAI, Jun 05: About 500 villagers of Hawai circle on Monday staged a dawn-to-dusk road blockade at Walong-Hawai road demanding scrapping of the 1200 MW Kalai II dam proposed on LohitRiver.

The villagers protested under the banner of Peoples Forum for Project Affected Families (PFPAF). Road communication at Hawai was totally disrupted for the whole day affecting even the movement of military vehicles.

Talking over telephone from Hawai, PFPAF Chairperson Behenso Pul said: We had earlier submitted memorandum demanding scrapping of Kalai II dam to Union Ministry of Forest and Environment, chief minister, local representatives putting our grievances. But no one is listening to us. So we decided to launch our democratic movement.

The villagers staging protest demanded for permanent halt of property survey, and other survey and investigation being carried out for the hydro electric project. A memorandum was submitted to deputy commissioner, Hawai placing all grievances and the demands.

We are highly encouraged by the massive participation of villagers in such short notice. It is a great moral boost for people working against dam, said Pul. But there was no participation from panchayat leaders, students union and other civil society organization.

The Kalai II Hydro Electric Project is to be developed by one of the major Reliance Power subsidiary, Kalai Power Private Limited (KPPL). It was incorporated on September 26, 2007. The project site is in LohitRiver in Kumblung and the submergence route extends upto 23 km upstream.

The project involves construction of 161 meter high concrete dam. An underground power house will be constructed to house 8 units of 150 MW turbines. The total project cost is estimated at Rs. 69,551 million and is likely to be completed in 7 years time.

The Kalai II project will lead to submergence of entire Hawai circle and all the major villages. Around 1500 people are being directly affected by the dam, said Pul. Since last week, we carried out grassroots campaign on dams. We haven’t met one single person who is in favour of dam. Everyone one is scared and against it. In Anjaw district alone, at least 6 large dams are proposed within 150 km of river route out of 13 projects in the entire Lohit basin. Water and Power Consultancy Services (WAPCOS) had earlier conducted a cumulative impact assessment of various hydropower projects in the entire Lohit river basin, as per the directives of MoEF.

WAPCOS made a farce report, completing within 2-3 weeks. The study is very poor and shoddy, said Pul.

According to PFPAF, they are, however, not opposed to all dams in Anjaw district. They view that projects along the tributaries of Lohit river can be harnessed, instead of building large dams along the main river alone. Citing a report in a national news magazine, Pul said the tributaries of Lohit alone had capacity to produce 8000 MW.

Out of the 7 circles in Anjaw district, 5 are situated along the main Lohit river. Even Hawai headquarter is in the bank of Lohit river. So, if dams are built along the main river, majority of the 18000 Mishmi population will be affected, said Pul.

In April 13 meeting with Chief Minister Nabam Tuki at Tezu, the PFPAF had suggested the government to consider harnessing power in the tributaries of Lohit river, not in the main river, where majority of population live. It is learnt that chief minster had made assurance of stopping all dams wherever not required.

If small dams are built in the tributaries, which are in the interior places, people there can benefit in the form of roads and other developments,Pul said.

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Annexure II

Anjaw shines in hydro power sector

Link : http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-02/guwahati/30580969_1_hydropower-projects-hydel-project-power-supply

TNN Jan 2, 2012, 05.50AM IST

ITANAGAR: The remote Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh is marching ahead to notch a record in the hydropower sector and is being hailed as the future powerhouse of the country with a 58,000 MW hydropower potential.

Kaho, a village in the district located near Kibithoo along the tri-junction of the China-Myanmar-India border, had created a record in 2007 by becoming the first village in the state to have round-the-clock power supply besides supplying power to the Army personnel guarding the frontier.

This feat was achieved thanks to the determination of the lone elected representative of the district, Kalikho Pul, and the equally committed deputy commissioner, Prashant S Lokhande. The two officials were instrumental in commissioning a micro hydel project in the last border village, a 24-hour trek away from last pitch road, for which all the machines and material had to be transported manually.

The duo’s efforts in turning the odds to their advantage made Anjaw the first of the 17 districts in the state to commission many of the ongoing projects.

Pul, who toured the district and inspected all the project sites recently, said the 2X100 KW Yapak, 2X50 KW Khrowtipani, 2X250 KW Matinala and 2X250 KW Teepani projects were commissioned recently and made the border district self-sufficient in power.

At the moment, Hawai, Hayuliang, Goiliang, Manchal, Walong, Kibithoo and Metengliang administrative centres and adjoining villages are getting 24-hour uninterrupted power supply, Pul said, adding that various development activities would begin now with availability of power, thereby boosting the local economy as well.

Located along the Sino-India border, the district is spread across an area of 9,936 sq km and crisscrossed by numerous perennial rivers, including Lohit, Dav, Dalai, Lati, Kulong, Syang, Helei, Yapak and Kathang, has total hydropower potential of above 7,000 MW.

The projects – 2X50 KW Hatipani at Goiliang, 2X30 KW Ashapani, 2X100 KW Kachopani, 2X30 KW Maipani and 2X200 MW Langpani at Gamliang – are likely to be commissioned within a month or two, Pul informed.

He added despite the locational and other disadvantages, the projects could register speedy growth because of proper utilization of funds and strict monitoring.

The hydropower projects were taken up with the vision to benefit the locals as well as the state in general, he said, adding the 16 MW Haleipani project, which is at an advanced stage, is likely to be commissioned within 2012. “It will cater to the needs of Lohit, Dibang and Changlang districts besides meeting the requirements of Anjaw,” he added.

However, according to official sources, no steps have been initiated so far for erecting transmission lines for evacuation of excess power to be generated by the Haleipan project. Once the transmission lines are commissioned the state would be almost self-sufficient and would not need to purchase power at high prices from outside.

Pul added as the Haleipani project is on the verge of completion, the state government, particularly the hydropower department, should take up the transmission line project proposed in Anjaw. The project is pending with the department for the last many years. Without the transmission lines, any quantity of power generated would be futile as it cannot be utilized for any purpose, he said.

Kaho, a village in the district located near Kibithoo along the tri-junction of the China-Myanmar-India border, had created a record in 2007 by becoming the first village in the state to have round-the-clock power supply

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Annexure III

INDIA: Violent Attack, Arbitrary Detention, Death Threats to activists of Meyor Community, Arunachal Pradesh

Link: http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/AHRC-UAC-152-2013

ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION – URGENT APPEALS PROGRAMME: Urgent Appeal Case: AHRC-UAC-152-2013

9 December 2013

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INDIA: Violent Attack, Arbitrary Detention, Death Threats to activists of Meyor Community, Arunachal Pradesh

ISSUES: Arbitrary detention, freedom of speech and expression, indigenous people’s rights, protection of environment, land rights, human rights defenders

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Dear friends,

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has received information from civil society groups regarding death threats, arbitrary detention and harassment of members of the Meyor community, a group of indigenous people in Arunachal Pradesh. They are being targeted for their activities on conservation of community land and natural resources. The Meyor community with about 450 members is classified as one of the Scheduled Tribes under the Indian Constitution and is mostly confined to the Anjaw district of the state. They have been criticized for opposing government activities that includes conversion of community land to reserved forest land and corruption in the Public Distribution System (PDS).

CASE NARRATIVE Several representatives of the community assumed a leadership role. They are, namely:

Mr. Chung Meyor, 33, Dhanbari village

Mr.Chaping Meyor, 55, Gaon Bura (village chief), Khroati village

Mr. Unchen Meyor, 45, Barakhundun village

Mr. Chethel Meyor, 25, Dhanbari village

Mr. Tharpa Meyor, 26, Musai village

Mr. Tenzing Dorjee Meyor, 30, Sotakhundun village

Mr. Fendey Meyor, 30, Musai village of Arunachal Pradesh

These men protested the conversion of the community forest land of Walong and Kibitho area into reserved forest land because it was carried out without the free, prior and informed consent of the Meyor community.

The conversion of community land into forest land was initiated, allegedly, by Mr. Kalikho Pul, a member of the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. He allegedly collected signatures from the Meyor community under the pretext of development works in the area. Conversion of this forest area was completed in 1995-1996 with a proposal of afforestation. Through an application, under the Right to Information Act, 2005 filed by Mr Dimso Manyu of the Meyor community, the people came to know of this development only on 14 March 2012.

The villages of the Meyor community are within a 36 square kilometer perimeter and their livelihood is dependent on natural resources. Over a period of time they faced limited access to the land resources due to the conversion of community land into ‘forest land’. Once they came to know of the conversion, the community vehemently opposed it. Due to their opposition, it is alleged that the police and unknown trouble-makers carried out frequent detentions, arrests, tortures and intimidations of community leaders and representatives of the Meyor tribe.

On 26 April 2013, armed reprobates arrived in a white Scorpio Jeep, threatened and attempted to torture Mr. Chung Meyor near Naraliang village on Tezu-Hayuliang Road. On the same day, Mr. Chung lodged a complaint about the incident at the Khupa police station. Police have not taken any action so far.

On 1 June 2013, Mr. Unchen Meyor filed a complaint at the Khupa Police Station. He cited mismanagement, corruption and illegal activities committed at a Fair Price Shop set up under the government’s Public Distribution System. Incidentally, on 12 November 2013 some local youths discovered that Mr. Agam Rai was selling PDS items illegally to people who were not subscribed under the PDS system. In connection to this discovery, a counter- police complaint was lodged by Mr.Kayawlum Tawsik, Chairperson, Zilla Parishad (local government), Anjaw Disttrict, against Mr. Unchen Meyor, Mr. Chethel Meyor and Mr. Tharpa Meyor.

On the night of 13 November 2013, Mr. Unchen and his family were brutally assaulted by a group of criminals at his residence in Barakhundun village. Mr. Unchen is still in critical condition due to injuries to his head, nose and chest. His daughter made a complaint about the attack on 15 November to the Khupa police station. However, till now, the police have not taken any action.

A second time, on 28 November 2013, Mr. Fendey Meyor, member of Gram Panchayat (local government) was arrested by the police from his village, Musai. They demanded the immediate surrender of Mr. Unchen, Mr. Chethen, Mr.Tenjing at the Khupa police. Mr. Fendey was released on 3 December on bail, with fabricated charges of vandalising still pending. Mr. Unchen is in hospital (at Aditya Diagnostic, Diburgar) struggling for his life. Mr. Chethen and Mr. Tenjing are in hiding, fearing for their lives and personal security. Similarly other community activists like Mr. Chung Meyor, Mr. Chaping Meyor and Mr. Tharpa Meyor are equally exposed to threats to their lives.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Arunachal Pradesh, bordering on China, is one of the most thinly populated states in India. It has 101 recognized indigenous tribal groups and about 50 languages. There are several rivers with the potential for generating hydro-electric power. The government has planned to construct some 168 mega-dams in the state, a move opposed by the indigenous people living there. There is a heavily militarized presence due to the international border. Draconian measures under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA) is applicable in two districts of Arunachal Pradesh, namely Tirap and Changlang, and a 20 kilometer area bordering Assam.

SUGGESTED ACTION:

1.            Urge the Government Authorities of India and the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh to guarantee the physical and psychological security of the members of the Meyor Community and its leaders.

2.            Urge the authorities to protect the indigenous people’s right to land and resources.

3.            Urge the authorities to protect the environment and not to grant deforestation rights.

The AHRC is writing a separate letter to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People and the UN Special Rapporteur on Protection of Human Rights Defenders for immediate intervention in this matter.

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Kalai II HEP – Status of compliance with TOR in EIA and EMP:

Serious non compliance of EIA-EMP: EIA-EMP must go back to consultants WAPCOS

Public hearing based on such EIA-EMP will not be legally valid

The EIA EMP reports of the proposed 1200 MW Kalai II HEP in Lohit basin in Anjaw district in Arunachal Pradesh has been put up on the Arunachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board in advance of the public hearing slated for January 18, 2014. The EIA-EMP report is supposed to comply with the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the EIA-EMP given by the EAC and MoEF, this is statutory requirement as per the EIA notification of Sept 2006. We have just checked this compliance and find that the EIA and EMP reports have not fulfilled a very large number of the TOR (Terms of Reference) that the project was to cover in EIA-EMP as per the TOR clearance given for the project on 9.12.2009. Such EIA-EMP will clearly not be acceptable even from statutory and legal point of view and cannot be basis for a public hearing. Hence Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board (APSPCB) and MoEF should immediately cancel the public hearing and ask the EIA-EMP consultants to comply first with the TOR.

A letter has been sent to APSPCB pointing out the violation of norms in organizing the public hearing and asking them to cancel the public hearing. This letter is available at “Letter to APSPCB – Public Hearing for Kalai-II HEP to be held Violating the Norms”. A detailed critique of the EIA-EMP report of Kalai II project is also available at “Critique of Kalai II HEP’s Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Study and Environment Management Plan“

Invalid extension since EIA-EMP does not comply with the TOR Here it may be added that as per minutes of 70^th EAC meeting dated Dec 10-11, 2013, “In the mean while, MOEF issued an Office Memorandum dated 22-Mar-10 which stipulates that the proposals which were granted TORs prior to the issue of this OM, the EIA / EMP reports should be submitted after public consultation no later than four years from the date of the grant of the TORs with primary data not older than three years. Thus the TOR issued to the project on 9^th December 2009 is valid up to 8th December 2013”. By this norm, the Kalai II TOR clearance should have lapsed on Dec 8, 2013. However, EAC decided to give an extension to TOR for this project, since the project developer claimed, as noted in EAC minutes, “With the completion of all the studies, the draft EIA/EMP report for 1200MW Kalai-II HEP was prepared and submitted by the developer to Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board (APSPCB) vide letter dated 31^st July 2013…”. However, this assumes that the EIA-EMP submitted complies with the TOR given by MoEF. But this analysis shows that there is serious non compliance of the EIA-EMP with the TOR and hence submission of such fundamentally inadequate EIA-EMP cannot be a valid reason for providing TOR extension beyong legally stipulated period.

Location of Kalai II HEP. Source: EIA report

A list of TOR noncompliancein the EIA-EMP is given below.

Noncompliance in EIA Report:

Geological and Geophysical Aspects

1. Regional Geology and structure of the catchment – some details only about has been mentioned in the EIA, the latter is not available
2. Seismicity , tectonics and history of past earthquakes in the area – the EIA only mentioned about seismicity, the latter two has been completely ignored
3. Critical review of the geological features around the project area – not available
4. Impact of project on geological environment – not available
5. Justification for location & execution of the project in relation to structural components (Dam height) – not available

Hydrology

1. Graph of 10 – daily discharge before and after the project at the dam site immediately below the dam should be provided i n the EIA study – Not available
2. The TOR mentioned “An elementary stream gauging station should be established at a suitable location downstream to the Dam site of the project” and “Installation of two Rainfall Gauge Stations at upstream of dam site” but none of these has been complied with.

Surprisingly the EIA also mentioned “No gauge and discharge (G&D) data is available at the Kalai-II project site or in the neighborhood.”

Biological resources

1)   “Cropping and horticulture pattern and practices in the study area” – no mention of this in the EIA

2)   Regarding identification of rare and endangered flora and fauna the EIA report mentioned only one “During the study in various seasons in Kalai-II HE project area, following IUCN Red List of threatened plant, Lagerstroemia minuticarpa falls under endangered category. Rest of the species are common in Arunachal Pradesh. However, this species though observed in the study area but not found in the land to be acquired for the project.” (section 8.7 page 8 -22) This is a strange claim that the species is observed in the study area but not found in the land for the project.

3) Fish and Fisheries

a)   The 5 location of study of Fish migrations & Breeding grounds was not done

b)   Impact of Barrage building on fish migration and habitat degradation was not studied

c)   Overall ecological impact upto 10 Km d/ s from the confluence of the TRT with the river or reach of the river in India have not been not studied. The impact of untreated and waste water into the river was not studied and no alternatives explored.

4)                  In the part of impact prediction, impacts on flora and fauna due to changed water quality has not been assessed

Socio Economic aspects In terms of Socio-economic aspects the following should have been included in the EIA report.

· Land details*

· Demographic profile

· Ethnographic Profile

· Economic structure

· Development profile

· Agricultural practices

· Cultural and aesthetics sites

· Infrastructure facilities: education, health and hygiene, communication network, etc.

· Impact on socio- cultural and ethnographic aspects due to Construction of Barrage

But the EIA does not do several of these profiles and limits itself to – Demographic profile, Educational levels, Occupational Profile, Land holding pattern, Assets owned and Livestock and other socio-economic parameters etc.

In page 11- 8 EIA report says “Impacts on cultural, archeological and religious properties Monuments of cultural/ religious/ historical/ archaeological importance are not reported in the project area. Thus, no impacts on such structures is envisaged.” However, the EIA should have looked into the impact of project on places of cultural, religious importance for the  local communities.

Impacts related to Land The EIA ignores what has been suggested in terms of impact prediction for land. The EIA completely ignores –

a) Changes in land use and drainage pattern

b) Changes in land quality including effects of waste disposal

c) River bank and their stability

d) Impact due to submergence

However, in page no 10-23 in the section “Impact of Impoundment on Landuse” the EIA mentions: “The construction of the dam would form the reservoir which will submerge about 640 ha of area in upstream. The area witnessed jhum/shift cultivation practiced by local inhabitants. Submergence of the area would not impact much on the prevailing land use pattern.” This is a false and misleading statement since in the hilly areas of Arunachal Pradesh, shifting cultivation is the main process of cultivation and submergence of such a large area is sure to have impacts on land environment.

TOR Noncompliance in Environment Management Plan:

Under Catchment Area Treatment Plan, the TOR letter had asked the project proponent to prepare 5 thematic maps v i z . Slope map, Drainage map, soil map, Land use/ Land cover Map, Aspect map. Basing on these maps an Erosion Intensity map should have been prepared. But the EMP only has two maps Slope map and Land use Map. No Erosion Intensity map was prepared.

Under Compensatory Afforestation Plan it was mentioned that “The choice of species for Afforestation should be suggested and the proper sites for the same should be demarcated on the maps.” There is no map in the EMP report’s chapter on Compensatory Afforestation Plan.

Under Greenbelt Plan the scoping clearance asked for “….suitable plant species should be recommended with physical and financial details. A layout map showing the proposed sites for developing the green belt should be prepared.” But the EMP report chapter on greenbelt does not at all comply with it. It makes no mention of any species and no map had been prepared.

The TOR clearance letter under “Reservoir Rim Treatment Plan” asked for “Layout map showing the landslide/ landslip zones should be prepared.” But the maps provided in chapter 17 of the EMP report are not at all clear and the when zoomed in they get blurred. So the sites, even if they exist in the maps cannot at all the located.

The TOR clearance letter under “Muck Disposal Plan” had asked for “The quantity of muck to be generated and the quantity of muck proposed to be utilized should be calculated.” This was not complied with and EMP report in chapter 6 mentioned only about the muck generated from excavation. Under the same, the scoping clearance also asked for “Layout map showing the dumping sites viz – viz other project components should be prepared.” There is no layout map showing the dumping sites.

The TOR clearance letter under “Restoration Plan For Stone Quarries” asked for “Layout map showing quarry sites vis-à-vis other project components should be prepared.” There is no map prepared for complying with this condition.

For “Landscaping and Restoration Plan” TOR letter asked for proper map showing landscaping and restoration site but this was not complied with in the EIA report.

The TOR letter asked the consultant to include a “Certificate” in EIA/EMP report regarding portion of EIA/EMP prepared by them and data provided by other organization (s)/Laboratories including status of approval of such laboratories. The consultant WAPCOS did not comply with this.

Conclusion These are crucial issues which were specifically mentioned in the TOR letter and EIA-EMP not complying with such crucial issues is unacceptable. The public hearing of the project is schedule to be held on 18.01.2014 but going for public hearing without complying with the condition mentioned in the TOR clearance is against the due process of law. The public hearing of Kalai II project should not be held and the EIA should be sent back to the projects developer. Moreover, as pointed out at the outset, the TOR extension given to the project beyond the stipulated period was based on false claim of submission of EIA-EMP that adheres to the TOR. Thus the extension given is invalid and the project must be asked to apply for TOR clearance afresh as per the MoEF norms. The public hearing if conducted on January 18, 2014 in spite of this, will not stand legal scrutiny.

Parag Jyoti Saikia  (meandering1800@gmail.com)

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP)

 SANDRP made the following submissions on Pinjal and Gargai Dam proposals which will be considered for First Satge Environmental Clearance ( Terms of References or TORs) by the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) of the 20th and 21st of January.

As is clear from the submissions below, there are major issues with these projects: Pinjal Dam will submerge 2100 hectares of forest land in 11 villages in Western Ghats, it falls under the Schdeule 5 of Indian Constituion: a special schedule for tribal areas. Local tribal communities are opposing the dam, but need support.

Gargai Dam will submerge 6 villages and 750 hectares of Tansa Sanctuary. Tansa Sanctuary is already scarred by many developments, including the Middle Vaitarna Dam. Putting more pressure on a protected area which also provides ecological services to Mumbai region is not justified.

Finally, these dams are for supply drinking and industrial water to Mumbai. But is the Mumbai Metropolitan region using its available water wisely? Has it explored any options like recycling and reuse of sewage water, the way Singapore or Chennai has? Is it serious about Rainwater harvesting? Has it taken accountable steps against the 1000+ MLD water that is wasted every day through leakages?

If answeres to the above are negative, is the region justified in asking for more dams, affecting people and nature? (SANDRP’s detailed (draft) report on the many dams coming up around Mumbai can be found here:http://sandrp.in/Mumbai_Dams_Draft_Report_Dec_2013.pdf)

If you agree with the points in the submission below, please consider making a similar submission to the MoEF.

__________________________

To,

Chairperson and Members,

Expert Appraisal Committee, River Valley and Hydroelectric Projects

Ministry of Environment and Forests,

New Delhi

Subject: Urgent, multiple concerns about considering Pinjal Multipurpose Project for TORs

Respected Chairperson and members,

We are writing to you as Pinjal Multipurpose Project is on agenda of EAC for TORs for the 71^st meeting to be held in January 2014.

This is a second submission we are making about Pinjal Multipurpose Project. The project was on Agenda for the 70^th EAC meeting, but was dropped without stating any reasons.

We had organized a meeting on dams coming up around Mumbai on the 18^th December 2013 and were also a part of farmers meeting at Pinjal Dam site. This submission draws on both these events. (Please see a Background Report on Dams around Mumbai here:http://sandrp.in/Mumbai_Dams_Draft_Report_Dec_2013.pdf)

At these meetings, there was unanimous conclusion that:

1.      No dams should be considered for Mumbai Metro Region (which includes MCGM) before cumulative impact assessment of the dams and developments in the region:

More than 12 dams in close proximity are in various stages of completion, construction and planning for supplying drinking and industrial water to Mumbai Metropolitan region (MMR). The affected region is home to various tribes and majority area id under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India.

As per cursory account of the current (unassessed) cumulative impacts, these dams will result in submergence of more than 22000 hectares of this region, including 7000 hectares of forest land and will affect more than 100,000 tribals.

Looking at these massive impacts, Forest Advisory Committee, MoEF, while giving stage I clearance to Kalu Dam (also in Thane district), has recommended “A cumulative Impact Assessment of all drinking water projects in the region on the flora and fauna of the area will be undertaken by the state government at the cost of the User Agency and mitigative measures and other conditions suggested in the study will be binding on the User Agency.” This has been reiterated in the Stage I clearance letter of the MoEF dated 31^st May 2013 (attached).

Even according to MoEF’s May 28, 2013 notification, cumulative impacts of multiple projects should be done before considering clearances for the next project. Hence, per MoEFs instructions itself, TORs should be issued only in light of the Cumulative Impact Assessment Study.

Hence, TORs should not be recommended to Pinjal Project without such an assessment is completed and public consultations on the same conducted.

Planned, under construction and existing dams around Mumbai. Map: SANDRP

2.       Strong opposition to the project:

Pinjal Project will be submerging 11 villages in Jawhar and Mokhada talukas in Thane district. This is predominantly a tribal region, with many areas falling under Schedule 5 of the Constitution and tribal sub plan. All the tribals from affected villages are strongly against the project. They have convened many meetings and have also passed Gram Sabha resolutions against the project. Considering the strong local opposition, Pinjal Dam should not be recommended TORs because:

a.     Violation of Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996:

As the entire affected region falls under the fifth schedule of the constitution, it comes under the PESA Act. PESA mandates that Gram Sabha consent is a mandatory pre requisite for any project being considered in scheduled region. In addition, PESA lays stress on local self-governance of tribal regions by tribals. Considering this and unanimous opposition to Pinjal Dam project, it should not be considered for TORs by the MoEF.

People’s meeting protesting Pinjal Dam. Date: 04.01.14, Photo: Amit Tillu for SANDRP

b.    Forest Rights as per the Forest Rights Act 2006 are not settled: 

Lives of the tribals in this region an inextricably linked with their forests. However, their community and individual Forest Rights on their forests have not yet been recorded or settled. In the absence of this, no project should be considered from this region that will affect their forests, as per the Forest Rights Act 2006.

Seeta bai, from Tansa Forests, Ogade village which will be submerged for Gargai Dam. Photo: Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP

c.     Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act (2013), section 42 (i)says: “As far as possible no land acquisition shall be made in scheduled areas”.

It also says: Section 42 (3) prior informed consent of gram sabhas is mandatory in Schedule 5 regions.

Considering the above legal issues and current local opposition, Pinjal Dam should not be considered by the MoEF.

3.     Ecosensitive Zone of the Western Ghats world Heritage Site:

Almost all of the affected villages by Pinjal Dam fall under Ecosensitive Area as per HLWG (High Level Working Group) on Western Ghats report and Eco-sensitive Zone I By WGEEP (Western Ghats Expert Ecology Panel) Report. While The HLWG mandates Gram Sabha consent prior to any developmental activity in Eco-sensitive Region, WGEEP bans large dams in ESZ I. Hence, looking at both these reports as well as extremely rich local biodiversity, TORs should not be recommended for Pinjal Dam Project.

Forests to be submergec by Gargai Dam Photo: Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP

4.       Serious misrepresentation of Clearance from NBWL:

Form I ( Table 3, Page 10) submitted by the project developer to MoEF says: “Permission from National Wild Life Board, New Delhi, Government of India for geo-technical investigations.”

To the best of our knowledge and from the minutes of the NBWL meetings, Pinjal project has never been considered by the NBWL for any clearance. If this is indeed the case, we ask the EAC to take strong action against the user agency for providing false and misleading information.

5.       Contradictions in PFR, Form I and additional information:

There are several serious errors in the Form I and the PFR uploaded on MoEF website. For example:

Form I states that the Gross Storage Capacity of the dam will be 421.6 MCM (Table 1, Section 5). But, PFR states that gross Storage Capacity of the dam will be 483 MCM (Page 8, PFR)

Additional information sheet says that annual yield at Pinjal dam site at 95% dependability is 421.6 MCM, while PFR states the same as 524 MCM.

PFR states 865 MLD water from Pinjal is earmarked for Mumbai, while the Additional information letter puts the same value at 1073 MLD!

Looking at these serious contradictions, the PFR, Form I and the letter about additional information needs to be reworked and the project should not be considered for TORs on the basis of such fundamentally misleading information.

Tribal settlement at Ogade village which will be submerged for Gargai Dam. Photo: Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP

6.       Form I says ‘No cumulative impacts”:

Form I says that there are no cumulative impacts envisaged (Section 9.4). However, there are very serious cumulative impacts of dams planned and under construction in the region, in addition to the existing projects. As states above, even the FAC and the MoEF has asked for a Cumulative Impact Assessment study of all dams in the region. Hence, the information provided in the Form I is wrong and the project should not be recommended TORs based on such misleading information.

7.       Serious errors in the Prefeasibility Report

The prefeasibility Report prepared by Mott Macdonald who is also the contractor for MCGM) has many errors. Some examples:

·         2011 Report gives MCGMs population as 14.5 million. (Page 1). According to Census of India Reports, population of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) in 2011 was in fact 12.4 million.

·         Pre-feasibility report has not relied on census, but on projections, which have proved wrong. Its water demand calculation based on these incorrect predictions are also wrong,

·         It assumes that in 2011, the slum population is 40% and planned is 60%, in fact according to census as well as Deputy Commissioner of Mumbai[1], it is exactly opposite ( slum population is 60% and planned is 40%) Thus, again changing the water demand projections.

·         Further water demand projects are based on exuberant figures like 240 lpcd. This is unjustified and no dam development should happen at a huge social and ecological cost for lavish water usage.

8.       Current water demand of Mumbai is misrepresented

·         The PFR as well as Municipal Commissioner’s note state that current water demand in Mumbai is 4240 MLD and there is a shortfall in supply currently.

·         This is completely wrong. According to Census 2011, population of Mumbai is 12.4 million, with a majority population living in the slums. According to Deputy Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai[2], slum population gets 100 lpcd (liters per capita per day) and non-slum population gets 200 lpcd water. Consumption is 686 MLD (Million Liters per Day) for slum and 1297 MLD for non-slum population, which comes to a total of 1983 MLD. It should be added here that slums constructed post 1995 are currently not entitled to any water from BMC.

·         Total water supply to MCGM at source is 3520 MLD.[3] According to the Deputy Commissioner, per capita water availability currently is greater than 180 lpcd, which is still higher than water supplied to London (150 lpcd), Singapore (160 lpcd) and Paris (150 lpcd). It is clear that there is NO current shortfall of water in Mumbai.

·         At the same time, if supply at source is 3520 MLD and the use is 1983 MLD for drinking water, 260 MLD for commercial and industrial uses[4] and 120 MLD en route supply, there is an additional 1157 MLD water that is available. That is 32.86% of the current water supplied at source is unaccounted for. It is assumed that leakages are to the tune of 25% supply at the source (which is very high), we still have 7.86% water supplied that is unaccounted for. This means 880 MLD of water! Nearly equal to two large dams Mumbai is planning to build!

·         But MCGM and PFR is stating that current demand is 4240 MLD[5] and that there is a current shortfall of at least 720 MLD. Where does this 4240 MLD figure come from? This is assuming 240 lpcd water supply which is extremely high and unjustified even by international standards!

This indicates that the PFR and Additional Information letter are misrepresenting and exaggerating the water demand of Mumbai, to justify an ecologically and socially destructive dam projects in the Western Ghats. MoEF should not recommend TORs for Pinjal Dam in this case.

9.       No options Assessment about Mumbai’s Water supply options

Before exploring options like new dams, Mumbai needs to explore and exploit its existing options. Some of these include:

Inequitable water supply: parts of MCGM get less than 40 lpcd water, some slum areas receive no water, while affluent addresses get over 300 lpcd water. Equitable, metered water supply will reduce the misleading water demand.

Fixing leakages and wastage: As per the PFR itself, MCGM wastes an unbelievable 1208 MLD water every day in leakages, which is more than the capacity of Pinjal and more than twice the capacity of Middle Vaitarna Dam which is completed this year for water supply to MCGM. There is no transparent program for fixing leakages and wastages in the system.

Rainwater harvesting: MMR receives average rainfall upto 2500 mm annually and thus has a huge potential of rainwater harvesting. MCGM has made rainwater harvesting compulsory for buildings above 300 sq. meters since 2007. However, MCGM needs to make RWH compulsory for all government buildings, all institutional buildings, all commercial buildings, all colleges, schools, parks, stations, flyovers, malls, multiplexes and give them one year time limit after which consequences should follow. This should be accompanied by credible monitoring and compliance systems. MCGM has not done this.

There are several examples where residents themselves have set up RWH plants either to recharge bore wells or to store water. Examples of Sea Line Apartments in Khar, Jago Mumbai Movement, or Shivaji Park in the heart of the city indicate the potential and benefits of Rain water harvesting. In Khotwadi slum, a public toilet with washrooms is managed by Triratna Prerna Mandal and does not use a drop of water from MCGM. The facility is used by nearly 1400 people daily and needs approx. 8000 liters of water per day. An ingenuous rainwater harvesting and ring well facility with a storage tank supplies all water needed. (Dhaval Desai, Time is Running out: Does Mumbai have enough water? Observer Research Foundation, 2012). Observer Research Foundation’s report “Why is there a drought of Rainwater harvesting in Mumbai” indicated MCGM’s Rainwater harvesting Cell is functioning dismally and does not even have data on number of building that have functioning rainwater harvesting systems or the status of RWH in government buildings. “The condition of the cell is pathetic and it functions in a small room, with leakages, no place for paperwork and severely limited manpower”. This indicates how non-serious Mumbai administration.

Navin Chandra, Sea Line Apratment with harvested rainwater. Photo: Times of India

Reuse and recycle sewage MCGM also needs to ensure that as much reuse and recycle of the sewage is affected in the city as possible. MCGM needs to make such systems compulsory for all government buildings, all institutional buildings, all commercial buildings, all colleges, schools, parks, stations, flyovers, malls, multiplexes and give them one year time limit after which consequences should follow. This should be accompanied by credible monitoring and compliance systems. MCGM has not done this.

Protection of local water systems Mumbai Metro Region also needs to protect all local water bodies including tanks, rivers, forests and wetlands that help harvest and recharge water. There is again no effective step in this direction.

Several lakes exist in Vasai Virar, Kalyan Dombivali, navi Mumbai, etc which can be protected and used as conjunctive sources. Bhiwandi still uses a lake in the city. Photo: Vasai Today

Demand Side Management In addition to above there are many other demand side management measures can be adopting, including use and incentives for water conserving flushes and such other appliances, among others.

No new projects for exogenous water supply sources should be considered until all these options have not been explored by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation and MMR bodies through credible policies and programmes.

10.   Contradicts the 12^th Five Year Plan:

The 12^th Five Year Plan Working Group Report on Urban Water states: “cities must only get funds for water projects, when they have accounted for the water supply from local water bodies and have protected these water bodies and their catchments. This precondition will force protection and build the infrastructure, which will supply locally and then take back sewage also locally”[6]. And that rather than focussing only on supply management, Investments in water supply must focus on demand management, reducing intra-city inequity and on quality of water supplied.

We hope that the EAC considers this roadmap laid out by the 12^th Five Year Plan, Working Group on Urban and Industrial Water Supply and Sanitation.

Conclusion Looking at all the serious issues above, we are sure that the EAC will not recommend TORs for Pinjal Dam and will respect the ecological integrity of the region as well as the protests from tribals who are entirely dependent on their forests for survival. These forests are also the lungs of Mumbai Metro Region and Western Ghats.

We and the affected tribals of Pinjal are looking forward to a wise decision by the EAC considering all the issues mentioned above and reject the Pinjal Dam proposal.

Thanking You,

Sincerely,

SANDRP

Submission on Gargai Dam:

It is based on the same lines as above. Additional points:

Serious misrepresentation of Clearance from NBWL in case of Gargai Dam:

Form I (Table 3, Page 10) submitted by the project developer to MoEF says: “Permission from National Wild Life Board, New Delhi, Government of India for geo-technical investigations.” This is completely false information.

The project was considered by the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife in its 28^th meeting (minutes attached) which states:

• “At the time of approval for the Shahi project, the project authority had given a written undertaking that “It is not necessary to construct any new source for water supply up to year 2031″. He (Kishor Rithe, NBWL) also mentioned that the former Chief Wildlife Warden himself had rejected this proposal as this dam will destroy 750 ha of good forest area of Tansa sanctuary and hence he would not support this proposal.”
• “The committee, after discussions, decided to have a site inspection by Dr Asad Rahmani and take a view based on the site inspection report.”

However, in the 29^th meeting, (See here: http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/NBWL-29th-MOM-06-06-13.pdf)non-official member Kishore Rithe writes: “The Proposal for survey and investigation for Gargai project in Tansa Sanctuary for Gargai River Project, Maharashtra   which requires 750 ha forest from Tansa Sanctuary, was rejected by all the non-official members and not suggested any site inspection. However the final minutes has recorded that the “The committee, after discussions, decided to have a site inspection by Dr Asad Rahmani and take a view based on the site inspection report.”

Considering the above, it is clear that not only does the project not have ANY clearance from NBWL, but ALL non-official members have rejected the project. When this is clearly stated in NBWL minutes, it is shocking to read the false information being provided by the user agency. We urge the EAC to take strong action against such misleading information being provided to the MoEF.

________________

Selected media reports about dams around Mumbai:

1. Front page report in Hindustan Times on 18th Dec

http://paper.hindustantimes.com/epaper/viewer.aspx

2. Report in Times of India

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/developmental-issues/Planned-for-urban-needs-12-dams-to-hit-tribals-hard/articleshow/27548259.cms

3. News report about the meeting on ABP: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpGPcEpL9eI

Press Note: January 20, 2014 

Kalai II Public hearing was full of violations, must be cancelled 

Affected people intimidated, beaten up and not allowed to speak by police & politicians

The statutory Public hearing conducted on Saturday, January 18, 2014 at Hawaii in Anjaw district in Arunachal Pradesh about the proposed 1200 MW Kalai II hydropower project in Lohit River Basin was marked by some serious violations that included intimidation of the affected people who wanted to raise questions and speak up, several people getting beaten up by the police and others, people that were not allowed to speak up, taking over of the public hearing by the MLA with his  six hour long speech and public hearing stretched beyond midnight, apparently to manipulate the minutes of the public hearing. All these are serious violations of all the accepted norms of public hearing and cannot be acceptable. This is in addition to many procedural violations that were communicated  through our written letter to Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board, Deputy Commissioner of the Anjaw district and members of the Expert Appraisal Committee  on River Valley Projects in Union Ministry of Environment and Forests, the letter remains unanswered.

A public hearing without public: Chairs remain vacant at the Kalai II public hearing venue

The hearing began at 10 AM with officials of WAPCOS (the EIA consultant agency) briefing the public about the EIA report. When Mr. Bihenso Pul, one of the project affected person stood up to question the officials on their false claim that a consultation was held with the affected land owners in the third stage of EIA, all of a sudden, the local MLA Mr. Kalikho Pul along with his close relatives and workers started threatening him and warning him of dire consequences. Witnessing this, the whole project affected public who had come to take part in the public hearing stood up in support and defense of Mr. Bihenso Pul. Following this, the personnel of Arunachal Pradesh Police started indiscriminately assaulting and lathi charging the public. Mr. Soti Tawsik, a Gram Panchayat Member from Nukung village from INC ticket was also grievously injured due to the lathi charge by police personnel when he tried to raise questions and express his opinion on the project. He was referred to Dibrugarh for further treatment as he was in a critical condition. Others injured include Baah Tawsik and Checheso Tawsik.

A Public hearing held by Suppressing the Public:
The Injury Mark from the Lathi charge is Clear on his Forehead

During the presentation on EIA by WAPCOS (it is an agency under Union Ministry of Water Resources, which itself functions like a Big Dam lobby and hence there is conflict  of interest in WAPCOS doing any impact assessment  work since impact assessment is supposed to be done by an unbiased, independent agency. Moreover WAPCOS is also involved in feasibility studies and detailed project reports for justification of projects, its track record is also very poor with both Expert Appraisal Committee and Forest Adivosry Committee of MoEF having crticised their work), even the illiterate villagers started expressing resentment over WAPCOS’s complete lack of knowledge on the topology, flora and fauna of the project affected region which was evident from the multiple factual mistakes made by the during the presentation. They were showing pictures of common fishes found in Parshuram Kund region and telling the villagers that the fishes were photographed from must higher elevation Kalai II project affected region. They did not even recognize the species of common Mynah available in the region and were calling it with different names.

The Public hearing was completely dominated by Shri. Kalikho Pul, the local MLA who spoke for 6 hours at a stretch starting from 6 pm, trying to convince the project affected families with misleading facts, while his workers and the Police personnel were highhandedly suppressing and manhandling every single person who stood to express his opinion or raise a question. Mr. Kalikho Pul also levelled baseless allegation of corruption against Mr. Bihenso Pul who is not even a government servant. Eventually, after being frustrated by the arbitrary, coercive and one sided conduct of the Public hearing, the project affected people started leaving the venue shouting slogans against the MLA and the administration stating they would never succumb to such illegitimate pressure tactics. If the public had not shown restrain and maturity during the mindless repressive act by police the incident could have taken an extremely dangerous turn.

An overwhelming about 60% of the affected people are against the project now being taken up. Even those 30% of affected who may be giving conditional support, have put forward a list of 23 conditions that are yet to be responded to. The rest 10% of the affected are as yet undecided. It is thus clear that the project as it stands do not have public support and with people not allowed to participate in the public hearing, the opposition will only get stronger. It may also be added that the same WAPCOS had done a shoddy EIA of the under construction Lower Subansiri project that remains stall for over 25 months now due to public opposition. The fate of  Kalai II, if pushed without proper credible assessment of the  project  and basin level impacts and credible public hearing, will  not be any different.

Finally, all the members of public left the meeting venue. The request to postpone the Public hearing in view of the incident to the next day by Mr. Bihenso Pul too was turned down and the hearing continued past 12 in midnight with only the Deputy Commissioner of Anjaw District, officials of Reliance Power Limited, Officials of WAPCOS & APSPCB and Mr. Kalikho Pul, Local MLA Anjaw district present during the meeting. This was clearly done to ensure finalization of manipulated minutes of public hearing.

This public hearing must be cancelled, an independent, credible enquiry conducted in the way in was sought to be conducted and in any case a fresh public hearing should be ordered after taking care of all the legal violations.

Bihensu Pul                                                                                                                                Birenso Pul

Chairman, 09402230335/ 08974543363,                                                                          Affected farmer

pulbihenso2012@gmail.com

21^st January 2014

To

Chairman and Member Secretary,

Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board

Paryavaran Bhawan, Yupia Road

Pappu Hills, Naharlagun

E-mail id – arunachalspcb@gmail.com

Sub: Lower Siang HEP (2700 MW) EIA-EMP Report not fully available on APSPCB website; many links not working; Public hearing will be illegal without full EIA-EMP in public domain

Respected Sir,

This is regarding the EIA-EMP report of Lower Siang HEP (2700 MW) uploaded on APSPCB website. The public hearing for the Lower Siang HEP is schedule to be held on 31^st January 2014.

As per the EIA notification of 2006 the full and complete EIA and EMP report should be made available on State Pollution Control Board website, in this case your website at least 30 days in advance of public hearing date as this is necessary not only for the affected people but also for wider consultations for concerned individuals and groups, as required under the EIA Notification. However, full EIA-EMP are not available on your website, with at least three chapters of EIA, one chapter of EMP and several annexures not opening, even ten days before the public hearing date.

It is very surprising and confusing to most people to see that the reports have been uploaded in 145 parts totaling 320 MB file size. These documents should have been uploaded as five reports as done for EIA-EMP report of several other projects. However, we have gone through all the files available on APSPCB website and based on perusal of these files, we find that crucial parts of the statutorily required documents are not available on APSPCB website. The list of missing chapters and annexures with the name of the report is given below. A screenshot of the links to these chapters are also attached and annexure as mentioned below. 

We therefore request you to upload these chapters immediately and also upload smaller size single documents of each report for the perusal of the local people and all concerned. In the meanwhile, since non availability of full EIA-EMP on pollution control website a month before the public hearing is a statutory violation, we request you to cancel the public hearing now slated for Jan 31^st, 2014 as holding a public hearing without full EIA-EMP on the APSPCB website a month before the PH will not be legally tenable.

Thanking you, we will look for your early response,

Yours Sincerely

Parag Jyoti Saikia

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People (SANDRP), 86-D, AD Block, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi – 110 088

Tel: 91-11- 2748 4654/55; http://sandrp.wordpress.com/, http://sandrp.in/

22^nd January 22, 2014

Dr. V. Rajgopalan

Secretary,

Ministry of Environment and Forests,

New Delhi.

Sub: 2700 MW Lower Siang project – Cancel Illegal Public Hearings proposed for January 31^st 2014.

Dear Dr. Rajgopalan,

We write to you on behalf of the Forum for Siang Dialogue (FSD), Siang Peoples’ Forum (SPF) Sirit-Siyom Banggo Dam Affected peoples’ Forum (SSBDAPF), Siang Bachao Andolan (SBF), Nyiko Bachao  Forum (NBF) to seek cancellation of the Three public hearings proposed to be held for the 2700 MW Lower Siang hydroelectric project in the East Siang, West Siang and Upper Siang districts of Arunachal Pradesh  on January 31, 2014.

Through a notification dated 30^th December 2013 published in the Arunachal Times dated 31^st December 2013 the Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board (APSPCB) has announced the conduct of public hearings for the 2700 MW Lower Siang project in three districts of Arunachal Pradesh. A scanned copy of the notice is attached for reference (Annexure 1).

There are a number of legal reasons due to which the public hearings need to be cancelled, here are a few of them:

1)      Public hearing on the same day and time in the West Siang, East Siang and Upper Siang districts of Arunachal Pradesh 

There are a number of local persons/clans/local communities who have land directly affected by the Lower Siang project cross-cutting the district boundaries. Such persons/clans/local communities will not be able to exercise their legal right to participate in all the public hearings in the districts where their ancestral lands are affected, since they are being held on the same day, at the same time. This is a gross violation of the letter and spirit of the EIA notification 2006 as well as the article 14 of Right to equality and article 19, the freedom of Speech under the Constitution of India.  

It is crucial that the public hearings are held in the three districts with sufficient days in between to enable the affected persons to participate in the public hearings wherever their ancestral lands are affected.

It cannot be argued that they should put their viewpoints in one of the public hearings in one of the districts. It is their legal right to participate in the public hearings wherever their lands are affected. This is a clear ground for cancellation of the public hearings and re-announcement  by keeping sufficient days in between hearings being held in different districts.

2)      Location of public hearing venue more than 100 km. away from 11 villages

The public hearing venue fixed for the East Siang district is Pasighat, the district headquarters, in the downstream-affected area of the project. While the APSPCB is welcome to organise a separate public hearing for the downstream-affected area, this is an extremely inconvenient location for the upstream-affected villagers in the East Siang district who are directly affected. And Pasighat town is nowhere listed as an affected village/area/circle in the EIA,EMP and Social Impact Assessment report of the Project Proponent. (Attached is the list of the affected villages as prepared by WAPCOS for the project.

The Public Hearing for Upper Siang District is also fixed at Katan which is 40 Kms away from Geku villages, which is encompassing the majority of the villages to be affected by the dam and above all there are not even a single Govt/Public or Private transport plying/ operating there. And the only village which is going to be completely submerged happens to be Pongging village under Upper Siang district, and the people have to walk on foot covering a distance of 17 kilometers to reach Katan as there is no Public/Private/Govt Transport system plying there.

Out of the 25 villages directly affected in East Siang district, at least 11 are more than 100 kms. away from the public hearing venue! In fact Riga village, one of the severely affected village under East Siang District is 172 km. away from Pasighat. A further nine villages are 60 – 100 km. away. Please note that 6 (Six) villages have to walk for up to 12 km. even before reaching the motor able road.

It is clear that the public hearing venue in East Siang district has been decided in order to disallow active participation of directly affected villages. This is completely unacceptable as per the letter and spirit of the EIA notification 2006 and various court orders/judgements on the need for proximity of the public hearing venue to the affected area. Public hearings cannot be located as per convenience of government officials who do not want to travel to affected areas and stay in the district headquarters. This another strong ground why the public hearings announced for 31^st January 2014 have to be cancelled immediately.

And Chapter II U/s 5 of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparent Land Acquisition Relief and Resettlement Act 2013 also clearly states that Public Hearing should be held in the Affected area and not otherwise.

3)      Siang river basin cumulative impact assessment study is not complete and placed in the public domain at designated places before public hearing

Section 9.4 of Form I of the EIA notification requires that cumulative impacts of a project are examined during the EC process. Further the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) has issued an OM dated 28th May 2013 stating that it will consider hydropower projects based on cumulative impact assessment and carrying capacity studies. The OM is attached as Annexure 2.

The OM states that:

“While  the first project in a basin could come up without insisting on cumulative study for all subsequent hydro-power projects in the basin it should be incumbent on the developer’ of the second/other project(s) to incorporate all possible and potential impact of other project(s) in the basin to get a cumulative impact assessment done.”

An important aspect of Appraisal done by EAC/MoEF is detailed scrutiny done of all documents including public consultation proceedings. As per the EIA notification 2006 (section 9.4 of Form I) and the MoEF’s OM dated 28^th May 2013 if cumulative impacts studies have to be the basis for decision-making, then such studies have to placed in the public domain at designated places 30 days prior to the public hearing.

However, the Siang river basin cumulative impact assessment is neither complete nor placed in the public domain at the designated places prior to the public hearing. Please note that this study currently underway is looking at all projects in the Siang river basin (Siang and its tributaries).

Although we disagree with the logic that the first project could come up without ‘insisting’ on a cumulative impact assessment study (since that project could be the most ecologically and socially destructive), in this case Lower Siang is NOT even the first project in the river basin for which either a public hearing is being held or being considered for environmental clearance. A number of public hearings have been held for other projects in Siang river basin and projects have also been already considered for Appraisal by EAC/MoEF. In fact 1000 MW Siyom and 700 MW Tato II project in the Siang river basin have already received final environmental clearance from the MoEF.

By no stretch of imagination is the 2700 MW Lower Siang project the first project being considered in the Siang river basin. Therefore as per the MoEF’s own OM dated 28^th May 2013, Siang river basin cumulative impact assessment will first have to be completed. Public hearing should only be held after this is completed and these reports are placed in the public domain at least 30 days before the hearing.

Keeping all this in mind we strongly urge the MoEF to direct the APSPCB to cancel the Illegally notified public hearings proposed for the 2700 MW Lower Siang project on 31^st January 2014.

Thanking you,

Sincerely,

Vijay Taram  Oyar Gao   Tayek Mize  Tasong Mibang    Takar Komut   Kento Jini  Reken Ingo

Forum for Siang Dialogue, Siang Peoples’ Forum, Sirit Siyom Banggo Dam Affected Peoples’ Forum, Siang Bachao Andolan, Nyiko Bachao Forum

Cc:

1) EAC on River Valley & Hydroelectric projects

2) Chairperson, Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board

3) Member Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Board

Bhakra Beas Management Board (BBMB, http://bbmb.gov.in/english/index.asp) is the manager of India’s celebrated icons: Temples of Modern India as our first Prime Minister called it. In a rare occasion, when we get a candid account of insider’s view of this organisation, it is worth taking note of it.

 Bhakhra Dam: Photo from BBMB 

BBMB, created on Oct 1, 1967, has current annual budget of massive Rs 1000 crores and manages the Bhakra Nangal Project, the Beas Project I (Pandoh dam, the Beas Sutlej Link and the Dehar Power House) and the Beas Project II (Beas Dam and Pong power houses). With close to 3000 MW of installed capacity it generates about 12.5 billion units of power annually.

Mr Satish Loomba, who served as Financial Advisor to BBMB between 1996 and 2001 has just provided an interesting view about the functioning of BBMB in his article Need to corporatise BBMB in The Tribune of January 23, 2014: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140123/edit.htm#6. While the author, as the title suggests, is advocating a corporate restructuring of BBMB, what he has said in the process provides a valuable insights from an insider. Here are some snippets:

Þ    “This organisation, which has become heavy, slow and bureaucratic…”

Þ    “However, despite a façade of running smoothly, the BBMB, from the organizational standpoint, suffers from several infirmities, limitations and internal contradictions.”

Þ    “At the core of the inadequacies in the BBMB are the… systems which do not promote efficiency, cost control and long term health of its vast assets… It has no concern with the value of its output…”

Þ    “… capital of the BBMB is not being preserved in accordance with accepted principles…” In fact in recent years, the illegal dumping of humungous quantities of muck (even a 100 MW project creates several million meter cube of muck) by the numerous major, medium and small hydropower projects in upstream Sutlej (see: http://sandrp.in/basin_maps/Hydro_Electric_Projects_on_Sutlej_River_in%20HP.pdf) and Beas (see: http://sandrp.in/basin_maps/Hydropower_Projects_in_Beas_Basin.pdf) basins is  leading to accelerated silting up of the Bhakra, Pong and Pandoh reservoirs, but no one, not even BBMB has shown the slightest concern.

Þ    “For the ageing irrigation wing assets, which are colossal and could be in sudden need of massive recapitalization…”

Þ    “… there is no account which summarises its results for a specific time period…”

This is a very serious indictment, not only of BBMB but also the way the “icons” of India are being managed by an organisation controlled by the Union Ministry of Power. Are these remediable infirmities or are these the implications of the kind and size of structures that BBMB manages? The author of the above article does not even pose this question, but is a very relevant one.

Declining Hydropower generation As per our analysis of hydropower generation from the three BBMB projects in Himachal Pradesh, namely Bhakra (1325 MW), Dehar (990 MW) and Pong (396 MW), with total installed capacity of 2711 MW, the generation per MW installed capacity has shown hugely declining trend with trend line declining by 18-20% in less than three decades. We also have graphs of individual BBMB hydropower projects that show similar trend line. This is a massive decline and in any responsible governance, questions would be asked as to why this is happening, but here, there are no questions.

Unravelling Bhakra In a comprehensive critique Unravelling Bhakra, (see: http://www.manthan-india.org/spip.php?rubrique1, available in both English and Hindi), author Shripad Dharmadhikary has shown that it is a myth to assume that Bhakra dams were the only or major reasons behind India’s food security, green revolution or irrigation in North West India. He has shown with facts and figures that are yet to be proven wrong that the contribution of Bhakra dams was limited.

Displaced people still awaiting justice Over five decades after commissioning of the Bhakra project, the people displaced by this most celebrated of Indian dams are still awaiting justice, as is clear from this latest news report (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140120/haryana.htm#10) in January 2014. This has been highlighted by many in the past including Govt of India’s Water Resources Minister in his autobiography, by SANDRP in 2002, by Shripad Dharmadhikary in above  mentioned book and continuous media coverage. This also shows the callous attitude of BBMB and concerned state and central governments.

Ad hoc, callous reservoir operation It is no secret that even this irrigation system is in bad and declining health. This is due to many reasons, including due to lack of maintenance and participatory governance. Several times it has been pointed out how unaccountable and inefficient has been the operation of the Bhakra reservoirs. Two recent occasions when SANDRP pointed this out include the following:

Þ       July 2012: Precarious situation of Bhakra dams: BBMB says emergency measures are imminent: Callous, ad-hoc reservoir operation again? Could this situation have been avoided? http://sandrp.in/dams/PR_Why_precarious_water_situation_at_Bhakra_dams_was_avoidable_July_2012.pdf

Þ    Sept 2010: Bhakra reservoir is being operated in casual, adhoc manner? Need for clearly defined norms of accountability in reservoir operations http://sandrp.in/dams/Bhakra_and_Need_for_accountability_in_Reservoir_Operations_Sept_19_2010.pdf

Þ    With general elections approaching in coming April May 2014, we have to wait and see if the Bhakra reservoirs will again be operated in an ad hoc manner like it happened before previous two national elections.

We hope right lessons will be learnt from this insider’s view of the alarmingly inadequate functioning of the BBMB and efforts will be made to make its functioning more participatory, transparent and accountable.

Himanshu Thakkar (ht.sandrp@gmail.com)

In late April and early May 2012, what was usually a roaring Seti river in Northwestern Nepal had slowed to a trickle. The milky-white turbid water had turned blue and clear. And then suddenly on May 5, 2012, the flooded river laden with slurry of sediment, rock, and water surged through the Seti valley in the Kaski district, obliterating dozens of homes and sweeping 72 people to their deaths. The floods waters were upto 30 m high at places. It reminded of the sequence of events leading to Tsunami. Questions swirled about where the water had come from and how it arrived with so little warning and that too in a non-monsoon season.

 NASA Earth Observatory (acquired October 7, 2013)

 Now, twenty months after the disaster, experts like Dr Jeffrey Kargel, hydrologist at University of Arizona, are in a position to say what happened. Dr. Kargel has concluded that it was not just one event but a series of event that combined to produce the devastation.

NASA Earth Observatory site describes the affected landscape as: “The landscape in this part of Nepal is shaped by a cycle of landslides and subsequent erosion. As the tectonic collision of India with Asia pushes the Himalaya upward, ice, water, and gravity, assisted by sporadic earthquakes, combine to grind the mountains down. The channel of the SetiRiver itself is cut into the remnants of a much larger debris flow, perhaps 1,000 times as big. 60 to 100 meters (200–330 feet) thick, the landslide deposits are composed of the same limestone as the peaks to the north. Likewise, the May 2012 flow left behind jagged fragments of limestone, carried from the crest of the Himalaya to the foothills in a single event.”

‘Seti’ in local languages means white, and Seti is the ‘White River’, its water is glacial white, turbid and laden with sediment.

The high intensity floods in May 2012 came in waves, and the first wave alone had around a quarter of a million cubic meters of water in just a few minutes. There were about 27 waves in all over the next hours, according to eyewitnesses, so several million cubic meters of water flowed overall.

NASA Earth Observatory image (acquired Dec 22 2013)

However, the series of event started weeks before the flood with a series of rockfalls that sent debris tumbling into the SetiRiver, backing water up in the extremely deep and narrow gorge. The last of these landslides occurred just a week or so before the flood. The situation grew dire on May 5, 2012, when an unusually powerful ice avalanche and rockfall tumbled down a vertical cliff on a ridge just south of Annapurna IV Mountain peak. The total drop from the Annapurna IV ridgeline to the bed of the Seti below Pokhara is about 6,100 meters (20,000 feet) spread over a distance of only 40 kilometers. The distance between the landslide dam and sight of worst floods was about 29 km.

Prof Jeffrey Kargel, writes (http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/blogs/fromthefield/2014/01/24/setiriverclues/), “A flash flood—what geologists call a hyper concentrated slurry because it was thick with suspended silt—had torn through some villages along the Seti River, in north-central Nepal, just north of the country’s second largest city, Pokhara. It was immediately recognized as a very deadly event, but the death toll—and a tally of those who remain missing but were clearly also killed—was not known exactly for several months. 72 souls lost. Though not large on the scale of global disasters, this event was terrifying for the fact that it seemed to come from nowhere—literally from beneath a blue sky.”

 AFTER IMAGE: shows the area on May 6, 2012, roughly 25 hours after the landslide

BEFORE IMAGE: the same area on April 20.  The diagonal lines are gaps in the data, due to a partial failure of the satellite.

One scenario (see: http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=78070&eocn=image&eoci=related_image) estimates that roughly 22 million cubic meters of rock broke off the slope of Annapurna IV. Colin Stark at Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at ColumbiaUniversity said: “There’s a drop of about 2,000 meters into the canyon, so we’re talking an enormous gain in momentum. Then I think the debris ran down the canyon at speeds upwards of 30 meters per second—a guess but what we see for the landslide itself.” Stark estimated that events unfolded in a matter of minutes with no time for a temporary dam to form.

This flood appeared to behave like a glacier lake outburst flood, and the news media can be pardoned for having assumed that it was. Prof Kargel adds: “Seeing that the disaster occurred at the foot of the AnnapurnaRange, within the Greater Himalaya, probably every expert’s first thought was “glacial lake outburst flood” (GLOF), because these were common in Nepal’s Himalaya, and the news accounts of the disaster event resembled accounts of GLOFs”. However, available satellite images showed there were no such lakes. “It was, however, clearly a disaster that had its source in a high Himalayan amphitheatre-like bowl, a glacially-carved structure called the Sabche Cirque. This structure was rimmed by some of Nepal’s most famous, picturesque mountain peaks, including the storied, holy Machapuchare ( “fishtail” peak) & Annapurna IV, a 24,688 ft” mountain.

Annotated photo from Dr. Kargel

Thanks to video from winged camera of a 2 seater plane incidentally flying over the area at the time of the event, the disaster’s trigger was sourced on a ridgeline near Annapurna IV.  Apparently part of this ridge—probably initially the glacier ice— collapsed, dropping ice and rock over 3000 m almost vertically onto unconsolidated rock debris (glacial moraines and ancient glacial lake silts and gravels) resting unstably in the deep bowl of the Sabche Cirque.  Some of that loose debris was also swept up by the avalanche, and the mass flowed and dropped through an additional 1,500 m into the SetiRiver gorge. Indeed, the conversion of gravitational potential energy to heat could have melted roughly a tenth of the falling snow and ice by the time it reached the SetiRiver.

A view of the gorges and also the distant peaks of the Sabche Cirque and the ancient glacial deposits in between. The avalanche entered the gorge from the upper right corner of the scene. (Photo: Dr. Kargel)

One source seemed to be definitely involved, and that was a rockslide-dammed reservoir in the gorge. This was definitely not a GLOF, but was caused by a rockslide into the SetiRiver gorge, formation of an impoundment reservoir over a several week period due to damming of spring snow and ice melt, and then the final triggering event of the mighty rock and ice avalanche off Annapurna IV.

The source area for the avalanche of May 5, 2012. Annapurna IV is just off image to the upper left. (Photo: Dr. Kargel)

Warning: More such events could occur “There are good reasons to be concerned,” Jeffrey says, “Something like this will happen again. It’s inevitable.” The Seti River Gorge is unusually prone to dangerous blockages because of how narrow and deep it is. And the same processes that triggered the spring 2012 rockfalls and avalanche are still at work. “The only question is whether future events will be as destructive or whether people in the SetiRiverValley will have absorbed the lessons of 2012 and found ways to move their homes out of the flood plain.” India should not forget that we are downstream country in Seti basin and what happens there will flow down here too.

More significantly, this whole episode raises the question as to how much do we really know about the Himalayas. Uttarakhand disaster of June 2013 was a wake up call to understand the Himalayan ecosystem and its implications for future well being of the people and environment of India. However, in stead of learning any lessons, our governments in Uttarakhand (as also in Himachal Pradesh, Kashmir and North East) and at the Centre, with environmentally-challenged Mr Veerappa Moily as the environment minister, are playing into the hands of short sighted vested interests. This is also apparent in the recent decision to sanction the massive Lakhwar dam on YamunaRiver in Uttarakhand without so much as an Environmental Impact Assessment!

We still do not have full explanation for the Uttarakhand disaster of June 2013. This explanation of the Seti River Disaster in the same Himalayas, which happened just a year before the Uttarakhand disaster highlights the urgent need for more serious studies and applying precautionary principle while dealing with the Himalayas, its  rivers and flood plains.

Compiled by SANDRP

Sources:

1. http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=82937&src=nha dated January 25, 2014

2. http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/blogs/fromthefield/2014/01/24/setiriverclues/ This entry was posted on Friday, January 24th, 2014 at 10:34 am. See the absolutely amazing photos on the site that gives an insight into the situation in the head reaches of Seti River… possibly indicates how little we know about the catchments of our Himalayan Rivers.

3. http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=78070&eocn=image&eoci=related_image dated May 6, 2012

4. http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=78117&eocn=image&eoci=morenh dated May 23, 2012

5. http://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2012/05/23/understanding-the-seti-river-landslide-in-nepal/, dated May 23, 2012

6. http://www.icimod.org/?q=7377, dated June 25, 2012

 January 30, 2014

To,

Dr. M. Veerappa Moily

Union Minister of Environment and Forests

Paryavaran Bhawan, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road,

New Delhi 110 003

vmoily@kar.nic.in

Subject: Issues about the laying of Yettinahole Diversion Project’s foundation Stone

Respected Dr. Moily,

We learnt about your announcement and support for laying the foundation stone of the controversial Yettinahole Diversion Project on January 31, 2014 in your parliamentary constituency of Chikkaballapur, from several media reports[i]. The project has not conducted any impact assessment study and does not have any statutory clearance from your ministry. This is in complete violation of several norms and laws and is shocking, to say the least.

Dr. Moily, our assessments based on local interactions, site visits, study of the Project report (the DPR for the project is still not ready) indicate that the project involves eight dams inside the Western Ghats, deforestation of more than 100 ha of forests inside the Western Ghats eco-sensitive region, water diversion without any ecological studies, 370 MW of power for pumping, a canal of 250 kms length, 1200 ha submergence near Devaranyadurga including submergence of 2 villages and 600 ha forest land. [ii]

The foundation stone laying ceremony is supposed to take place on the 31^st January 2014 at Muddenahalli, Chikkaballapur, which also happens to be your current constituency.  It is clear why you chose Chikkaballapur to lay the foundation stone, and not Sakaleshpur, from where the water will be diverted, or Dakshin Kannada, which will face most of the impacts of the project. In Sakaleshpur and entire Dakshin Kannada, (which was your constituency in the past) there is a huge and mounting opposition to Yettinahole Diversion and also to your decision.

Just in the last two weeks, there have been attempts to a stop train in protest, numerous dharnas, hunger strikes, letters in opposition and a Satyagraha in Netravathi River to oppose this project.[iii]

Rail Roko protest against Yettinahole Diversion Photo: Daiji World

Despite this growing discontent, you, as an MP from Chikkaballapur and the Union Environment Minister, or the Karnataka Government did not feel the need to initiate a dialogue with the people of this region. Has the government learnt no lessons from Delhi as to what happens when local voices are ignored and unheeded?

Protest in Hassan (in addition to Dakshin Kannada) against Yettinahole Diversion. Photo: The Hindu

Why has the Karnataka Government or the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests, which you now head, not thought it necessary to assess and address the serious ecological impacts of this project? Why have you supported the fraudulent tactics of this project to escape environmental clearance?  Our letter to the Ministry in his regard dated 10 Sept 2013, which was endorsed by several experts remains unanswered till date[iv].

As the  Minister of Environment and Forests, it is your duty to see that projects with significant impacts on ecology and dependent communities are assessed. Why are you escaping that duty?

Why is the Karnataka Government and the MoEF, under you leadership, hiding behind weak technical clauses of the EIA Notification 2006 to claim that the project does not qualify for Environment appraisal?

In fact the EIA Notification 2006 requires that there is thorough appraisal of the project. We have sent you a letter in this regard again on the 28^th of January 2014, with scanned pages from the project report proving  this.

How can you support foundation stone laying ceremony when RTI reveals that Forest Department has not even assessed the forest area affected by this project?

How can a Minister of Environment and Forests of India indulge in an illegal act of formal initiation of a project that does not have environmental or forest clearances?

The project will come to the Ministry of Environment and Forests, headed by you, for Forest Clearances. But you have supported the foundation stone for this project already, giving a signal that forest clearance is a foregone conclusion.

If this is not conflict of interest, what is?

And all this for 2.8 TMC drinking water for Kolar and Chikkaballpur Districts. Has the government conducted any studies to prove that project with Rs 100 Billion cost and severe environmental impacts is the least-cost option to get drinking water for Kolar and Chikkaballapur in whose name the project is being pushed?

Dr. Moily, as the Union Environment Minister, it is you duty to address these questions before you support the foundation stone laying of Yettinahole Diversion Project.

Not doing so is in violation of environmental norms and legal stipulations.

We are looking forward to getting a point-wise response from you.

Sincerely,

Parineeta Dandekar, Himanshu Thakkar, SANDRP, Pune and Delhi

Dr. T. V. Ramchandra, Energy and Wetlands Group, Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, Karnataka 

Panduranga Hegde,Parisara Samrakshana Samithi, Appiko Movemenr, Sirsi, Karnataka

Dr. Shrinivas Badigere, Water and Irrigation Expert, Bangalore, Karnataka

Dr. Latha Anantha, River Research Center, Kerala

Dr. Rajeev Raghavan, South Asia Co-Chair, IUCN SSC/WI Freshwater Fish Specialist Group
Member, IUCN SSC Red List Committee 

Debi Goenka on behalf of Conservation Action Trust, Mumbai

Shankar Sharma, Power Policy Analyst, Tirthahalli, Karnataka

R. Sreedhar, Managing Trustee, Environics Trust and Chairpserson, Mines , Minerals and People

Vidyadhar Atkore, Fisheries Researcher, Bangalore, Karnataka

Neethi Mahesh, Mahseer Conservancy, Karnataka

Dr. Ashok Kundapur, Udupi, Karnataka

Anand Krishnamurthy, Bangalore, Karnataka

Dr. Nitya Ghotge, Anthra, Pune

Ms. Nyla Coelho on behalf of  Paryavarni, Belgaum, Karnataka

Pratim Roy on behalf of Keystone Foundation, Kotagiri, Tamilnadu

Dr. Archana Godbole, Jayant Sarnaik, AERF, Pune

Dr. K. Amitha Bachan, Western Ghats Hornbill Foundation

Vijay Sambare, Lok Panchayat, Sangamner, Maharashtra

Dr. Bhaskar Acharya, Independent Researcher, Bangalore

Headwaters of Netravathi and Gundia threatened by Yettinahole Diversion Photo: Parineeta Dandekar, SANDRP

The foundation stone of 3000 MW Dibang Multipurpose Dam was laid on 31^st January 2008, by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Six years have passed since then but the project is yet to get the necessary  forest and environment clearances. This in a way reflects the state of environment governance in India where the foundation stone of mega dam is laid without getting any necessary clearance. 

The affected people stopping the public hearing in 2008 since they knew that that was their only chance to be heard. Source: http://www.roingcorrespondent.in/this-circus-should-stop-no-public-hearing/

This project was considered for forest clearance in the FAC meeting held on July 11^th and 12^th 2013. The FAC meeting minutes noted “Felling of more than 3.5 lakh trees most likely to have adverse impact on general eco-system of the area, recovery of which may be very difficult through any type of mitigate measures”.

The Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on River valley and Hydroelectric projects considered Dibang multipurpose project in its 68^th meeting on September 23rd 2013 for environment clearance but this was in complete violation of  norms. Following the “Lafarge vs Union of India and others” case of 2011, the Supreme Court of India had said that a project without forest clearance cannot be considered for environment clearance. SANDRP had pointed this out in our submission to EAC dated 20/09/2013. But EAC seemed to take no account of that.

Out of the 168 projects proposed for Arunachal Pradesh, this is the only multipurpose project. The minutes of 68th EAC meeting states that this project has dual objectives. The primary objective is flood moderation while electricity generation is its secondary objective. This is highly doubtful though since the project does not have the adequate storage capacity. On the other hand, the installed capacity of the project i.e. 3000 MW is also one of the highest among 168 hydropower projects.

The Dibang multipurpose dam is located 1.5 km upstream of confluence of Ashu Pani with Dibang river at Munli village in Lower Dibang Valley district. Construction of this dam involves two districts of  Arunachal  Pradesh  viz.  Lower Dibang Valley and  Dibang Valley districts. All the project components e.g. dam, power house will be are located in Lower Dibang Valley District while reservoir which will submerge 43 km length of the river will fall in both districts.  The total land requirement for this dam is 5794.142 ha out of the 5022.842 is forest area with very rich bio-diversity. Submergence of such a huge forest is one of the major concerns associated with this dam and that is why the Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) has refused forest clearance to this project.

The Dibang multipurpose project plans to construct 288 meter high concrete gravity dam with an underground dam toe power house. The reservoir of this project will submerge 40.09 sq km area. The total cost of the project at November 2007 price level was estimated at 15886.39 crores.

It is important to note that the public hearing for the project faced vehement opposition of the local people. The public hearing of the project has been halted for several times. The local people expressed serious concern regarding Dibang multipurpose project and feared that influx of outsiders for dam building will lead to a demographic imbalance in the Dibang valley. This is a serious issue since the primary inhabitants of Dibang valley are Mishmi (Idu) which is a very small community with a population of 11,023 according to 2001 census. According to NHPC estimation a workforce of 5800 people (labour and technical staff) would be needed for the Dibang multipurpose project. But All Idu Mishmi Students Union (AIMSU) has contested this figure and opined that a single project would bring about 15,000 people into the region. It is also reported that NHPC claim that the project will cause ‘negligible human displacement’ grossly undermines its harmful impacts on smaller ethnic community such as Idu Mishmis. A video of the protest by local people can be seen here - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8TCUKh2hQY

No cumulative impact assessment of dams in Dibang valley has been conducted e even though 17 projects have been proposed for this region. The TOR clearance had been given to 86 MW Ithum and 3097MW Etalin HEP in the basin by EAC. Without any cumulative impact assessment study of the basin no project should be given environment clearance. People from Dibang valley has also written to previous EAC on demanding cumulative impact assessment study. A letter to EAC from a local person Raju Mimi, dated January 31^st 2013 stated “Since the 3097 MW Etalin project is on agenda again for the 64th EAC meeting to be held on Feb 1st – 2nd 2013, we re-iterate our demand to have prior cumulative impact assessment of multiple hydropower projects by urgently commissioning a Dibang river basin study.”

Other Glaring Issues of Dibang Multipurpose Along with the above mentioned issues SANDRP had made detailed submission to EAC pointing to some of the glaring concerns associated with the project. Some of these issues are -

Incomplete and Shoddy Downstream Impact Assessment: The downstream impact assessment done for the Dibang multipurpose does not take into account impacts of the dam in Assam. The downstream impact assessment study does no assessment beyond   Dibru-Saikhowa and whatever has been done is also very much inadequate.

No Public Hearing Held in Assam: Even though the Dibang multipurpose will have severe impacts in downstream Assam, there was no public hearing held for the project in Assam.

Mining for the Dibang Multipurpose will lead to Catastrophes: Mining of boulder, sand and other construction material for the Dibang multipurpose project will have very severe impacts on the river as well as on the local environment. The amount of boulder required for the construction of this project is 193 lakh cubic meter as stated in the project document. This is really astonishing figure and impact of such mining on the river bed and nearby areas will be catastrophic. The fragility of the Himalayan mountain range is not unknown to anyone and mining in such a sensitive hilly area will area will only increase the risk of landslide and disaster. The catastrophe of Uttarakhand floods is a clear example of this.

No Climate Change Assessment Impact of climate change on the project and impact of the project on the local climate. No attempt has been made to assess the impact of green house gas emissions from the reservoir of the dam which extends to 43 km.

No assessment impacts of peaking power operations Impacts Detail assessment of impacts of peaking power operation during non-monsoon months not done. Impacts on the flow characters of the river due to this dam, what will be the changes and how these will impact downstream areas.

No Assessment of Disaster Potential Impact of the project on disaster potential in the project area as well in the downstream including Assam due to construction and also operation at various stages, say on landslides, flash floods, etc.

No Assessment of Silt Flushing Impact of changing silt flows downstream from desilting chamber and from silt flushing in monsoon on the downstream areas not analyzed. A detail account of how the silt from the dam would be flushed out annually and what would be the impact of this in the downstream  as well as on the geo morphology, erosion, stability of structures etc was not done.

What did the EAC say in 68^th Meeting The EAC in its 68^th meeting did not recommend environment clearance to the project and instead pointed out several issues in the EIA – EMP report. Some of the important issue pointed out by EAC are –

1. Attempts may be made to avoid  submergence  of huge area  of rich forest land. It merits mention that  due to the very high forest land  submergence,  forest clearance has not yet been accorded by FAC.

2. Environmental Flow in the diverted portion of about 1.2 km  i.e. between dam and TWL  of dam toe PH  is to be reassessed and  a  suitable quantity is to be proposed for release as per extant norms. 4% flow as suggested was found to be inadequate.

3. Numbers of Fish species  reported was found to be on lower side and NHPC was asked  to verify this and report accurately.

4. Number  of  plant  species  reported  also  appeared  to  be  on  lower  side    and  to  be rechecked by NHPC.

5.At  this  altitude  of  the  project  (about  3000m),  snow  leopard  should  have  been sighted. It may be erroneous to report that leopard was not found  in the study area. Therefore, this may be relooked.

6. Study  area  in back water/ submergence is also to be  extended for proper inventory of both flora, fauna/bio-diversity.

The impacts of the Dibang multipurpose project are going to severe on the river, people and overall ecology of Dibang river basin. But sad part is that no proper assessment of these impacts has been done till now. Looking back at the six years since the laying foundation stone for the project we reiterate what Forest Advisory Committee said about the project “ecological, environmental and social costs of diversion of such a vast tract of forest land, which is a major source of livelihood of the tribal population of the State, will far outweigh the benefits likely to accrue from the project.”

Parag Jyoti Saikia

By Malika Virdi and Emmanuel Theophilus, Himal Prakriti

 While hydro-power is projected as clean energy, there is sufficient evidence to the contrary, on various counts. One of the major concerns about hydropower projects, is that the dams, whether they be impoundment dams or diversion dams (the latter going under the misleading euphemism nowadays of run-of-the-river structures), critically fragment a river. Regulation and release of water at extreme lows (often nil) and sudden releases apart, dams are an impassable barrier for migratory fish, progressively depleting populations past critical thresholds, eventually leaving rivers bereft of life. Dead rivers affect not only the freshwater aquatic realm, but also all terrestrial life dependent on rivers, including large human populations. The impacts are known to cascade down the entire river continuum down to the oceans. Not only does such river regulation have serious political implications in terms of equity and justice between proximate and faraway users, but far-reaching cultural repercussions as well.

Kurichhu HEP Photo: Druk Green

In the on-going discourse on the large-scale build-up of hydro-power projects in the Himalaya, which will soon be the most densely dammed region on earth, one encounters proposed part-solutions, often billed as mitigation measures. Ofcourse, every attempt at addressing the serious problems created by hydropower projects is desirable and welcome. However, which of these actually mitigate or provide solutions to the problems created by hydro-power projects, and which of them only serve to provide camouflage from public gaze, or a cover of legitimacy for mandatory approvals, does require to be looked at more closely.

We have been hearing for long about fish passes of various designs constructed on hydro-power dams in the US and in Europe, to allow the passage of many species of migratory fish, to travel to their breeding grounds in distant mountain rivers. None of the numerous hydro-power projects under construction in Uttarakhand have incorporated any provision for the passage of seasonal migratory fish, and this is puzzling. How are hydro-power projects cleared on environmental grounds and approved despite their disastrous impact on fish movement and subsequently on fish populations?

One instance of a proposed mitigation measure is what was proposed by WAPCOS for NTPC’s Rupsiabagar-Khasiabara HEP in the Gori river basin where we live. While the project has recently been denied Forest Clearance for diversion of forest land for the specific dam-site, it had earlier managed to secure overall Environmental Clearance on the basis of proposed mitigation measures, and is being cited here as a case in point. Addressing the problem of creating a barrier for movement of migratory fish, WAPCOS proposed an entire fish breeding-and-stocking programme. The proposal was for setting up facilities for producing seed of snow trout (Schizothorax richardsonii) at a cost of Rs. 16.05 million, for periodically stocking 3 cm long fingerlings with 100 fingerlings per km of river, for 10 km upstream and downstream of the dam structure, for 5 years. Serious money that could even sound like a serious effort. Only, anyone living close to the river knows that the proposed dam-site itself, let alone 10 km above it, is entirely uninhabited by any fish whatsoever. This was clearly a ‘mitigation measure’ proposed only to obtain environmental clearance. It is another matter that even WAPCOS’s species fish-list for the river was just a wish-list.

In the context of addressing the problem of fish-passage, we were informed of a fish-ladder constructed by the NHPC for the Kurichhu HEP in Mongar in Bhutan, so we undertook to visit and see the fish ladder design, and to speak to the hydro-power company to understand how effective it was. The Kurichhu is a medium sized Himalayan river in Eastern Bhutan, forming the upper main-stem of the Manas river which originates in Tibet. Access to it by road is long and circuitous, and after a year of trying to get away for long enough to visit, we finally reached there on the cloudy afternoon of 11th January 2014. Prior permission had been sought for the visit through contacts in India, and we were received and shown around with rare grace and courtesy by officials of DrukGreen, the company running the hydro-power project after handover to it by the NHPC of India. The sight of the ladder was thrilling, and we were even permitted take photos of the fish ladder.

Fish Ladder at Kurichhu HEP Photo : Authors

January is not the season for either upstream or downstream movement of fish in that zone, so we could not see fish movement in the ladder for ourselves. However, we gathered the following:

The dam is a 55 m high (from the foundation) concrete gravity dam located at an altitude of about 530 meters asl and is 285 meters across the beautiful, dark, blue-green Kurichhu river at Gyalpozhing. At full reservoir level 15.70 million m³ of water is impounded behind the dam. At the time of our visit, one of the four turbines was operational and there was a small release of water downstream of the dam. The fish ladder was in flow, releasing just 0.8 cumecs of water. The project authorities said that during such low-flows, this is the only flow from the dam, since there is no minimum flow required to be maintained by law in Bhutan. The ladder is a pool-and-weir type, with submerged orifices and centrally located notches.  A pool and weir design is one of the oldest styles of fish ladders. It uses a series of small dams and pools of regular length to create a long, sloping channel for fish to travel around the obstruction, in this case the dam. The channel acts as a fixed  lock to gradually step down the water level; and to head upstream, fish must either negotiate a slot, or jump over from box to box in the ladder.

The Kurichhu fish pass has a total of 98 baffles, each 1.5 m wide and 1.5 m deep, arranged at a distance of about 2.9 m. The total depth of each pool is 2 m. There are two exits (water entrances) to the fish pass, the lower exit placed 5 m lower than the other, to provide for flow at different draw-down levels. The vertical height between the water level of the ‘stilling basin’ (interesting name for a reservoir holding 15.7 million m³ of water) and the water entrance for fish from below the dam is 32 meters. To achieve this height, the fish-pass channel has to traverse a total distance of 320 m, leading to a slope of 1:10, and resulting in a drop in height per pool of 0.3-0.4 m. Quite impressive, except that the slot in the centre of each baffle does not exceed 25 cm in width. Clearly, no way for big fish, and Mahseer (Tor), the fish with the longest migration distance in this river, also happens to be the largest carp in the world.

We asked the project manager whether they know the fish ladder to be effective. He said that on a few occasions during the fish migration season, they had stopped the flow of water in the ladder and found some small fish in some of the drained pools. They did not know which species they were. We enquired whether there had been any systematic study of the efficacy of the fish ladder, in terms of comparing, with a baseline since commissioning the dam in 2002. Whether there was a change in species composition, or a significant change in upstream fish populations during this time? He replied that they had not.

Mahseer in Bhutan’s Rivers. Photo with thanks from: http://yesheydorji.blogspot.in/

Discussion: It is understandable that project authorities in Bhutan were not familiar with names of fish species or other particularities, because people in Bhutan in general do not catch or eat fish. This could stem from Buddhist tradition, but also from funereal custom, where one of the traditional options is that the body of deceased adults is dismembered and consigned to the river for fish to consume.

On enquiring about any documentation with regard to the fish ladder design, they kindly shared a document titled ‘Feasibility Studies for fisheries development in Kurichhu reservoir, Bhutan’ prepared for NHPC, Faridabad, by CIFRI, Calcutta. While CIFRI has been hired by NHPC ostensibly for extending their expertise on fish, they could have spared us their use of tired narratives of ‘development’. It is clearly beyond their area of expertise. Prefacing their feasibility study on fish passes with statements such as “advancement of human civilization and distortion of natural habitat go hand in hand,” and “requirement of electricity is synonymous with the development of civilization”, and more, just exposes their fait accompli. We photographed relevant pages onsite, and along with discussions, have gathered the following:

Since every fish passage requires to be designed to cater to the specific behavioural propensities and physical capabilities of a particular set of fish species inhabiting the river in question, certain stretches of the river were sampled by CIFRI. The fish they caught can be grouped into three broad groups:

• Snow trout, mahseers and minor carps: Schizothorax richardsonii. S. Progastus, Barbodes hexagonolepis, Labeo dolycheilus.
• Loaches: Garra lyssorhinchus, G. gotyla,
• Catfish: Glyptothorax coheni, G. brevipinnis, Pseudocheneis sulcatus.

CIFRI did not catch Tor during sampling, but during dam building many fish were caught by workers and staff from India, one 15 kg and another 20 kg fish near Kurizhampa bridge. Fish of this size cannot be Barbodes or Chocolate Mahseer, and seem to be Mahseer of the Tor genus (species tor or putitora).

The three functional categories of fish migration in general are: Reproductive (spawning) migration, feeding (trophic) migration and refuge migration. For this, hill-stream fish are known to migrate between three major habitats: A wintering habitat, a feeding habitat and their spawning habitat.

Dams and other diversions for river regulation are seen to impact fish in five major ways:

• Obstruction in the ascent of fish in their migration for spawning.
• Reservoirs can inundate spawning habitat, silting up gravels,
• Changes in river water quality due to inter-basin transfers and stratification of water.
• Natural flows downstream are radically altered. This includes abruptness of changes in flow, in volume, velocity and seasonality.
• Prevention of young migratory fish and refuge migrants from descending to lower reaches.

In addition, adverse repercussions result from indirect effects such as the disruption of the food-webs downstream, stranding of fish during rapid flow fluctuations, and siltation in the reservoir above the dam. The chemical, trophic and thermal properties of a river are greatly  altered. Additionally, changes in slope, riverbed profile, structure of the bottom surface, submergence of gravel zones, and changes in the thermal and trophic regimes, affect the habitability of certain stretches of the river.

Designs of fish passages are many, and can be broadly categorized as follows:

• Fish ladders. Pool and weir, baffle fishways, rock-ramp fishways, vertical slot.
• Fish lift locks
• Fish elevators
• Fish trapping and hauling.

Pool and Weir Type Fish Ladder, Bonneville Dam, United States Photo: Wikipedia

Special Fish Ladder for Salmon in Sweden. Photo: Wikipedia

The basic information you need for designing a fish pass, is details about the species particularities such as normal cruising speed and burst speed of target species. Some important criteria are:

• Provision of comfortable passage for all migratory species, including the poorer swimmers, over the entire length of the fish pass. To achieve this, provision for refuge against fast currents at regular intervals should be made.
• Year-round functionality, under different flow regimes, temperatures and oxygen levels, notably to enable fish displaced by floods to return to their initial habitat.
• Sufficient space or carrying capacity allowing massive upstream ascents during reproductive or trophic migration.
• Positioning the entry of the fish pass so that it is readily identifiable and accessible to the migrants.
• Attraction of fish to the fish pass entrance in the downstream (water exit) in case of upstream migration and deterring them from dead-ends and dangerous places.
• Positioning of upstream outlet (fish exit) of fish passes far enough from spillways and turbines to minimize the risk of being swept downstream or being damaged.

Clearly, creating an artificial fish passage is complex and would not work if the multiple aspects are not considered and provided for. Ease of physical passage is just one important aspect. Migration is specifically timed to match various conditions, and even a delay in migration can nullify the purpose. For example, upwelling and excessive turbulence in the areas near the fish entrance are undesirable, as they can confuse migrating fish from finding the entrance. For this, the gates of the dam are required to be manipulated so that the heaviest spill is at the bank opposite the fish-way, with the result that the velocity barrier forms a diagonal lead, a traffic signal of sorts, across the river to the fish entrance. Apart from a sufficient ‘attraction flow’ at the entrance of a fish pass, projects elsewhere have experimented with directing fish traffic with the help of guiding screens, and the use of overblown ‘traffic signals’ such as acoustic arrays, strobe and mercury lights, and even electric fields.

At a fish passage such as the array at Kurichhu, it is critical that at the entrance of the fish-way, the gate is to be manipulated to ensure possible passage of fish. Depth and velocity to suit particular species need to be maintained. CIFRI recommended a ‘compromised’ depth of 25 cm to be sufficient to allow fish passage. In addition the gates should be regulated to ensure that all the baffles are submerged, allowing the fish to swim over them upstream comfortably. This was not the case, when we visited, the flow level did not allow for the baffles to be submerged, as visible in the photograph as well.

Even with a depth of 25 cm in the fish exit, the variable head-height as per the draw-down of the reservoir can create a higher velocity than desired. While CIFRI warns that this poses apprehensions regarding hindrance to fish migration, they dismiss these apprehensions summarily thereafter, stating that this high velocity is observed only for a short distance, which fish would be able to negotiate using burst speed (high speed, short duration). CIFRI mentions that it is only when the speed at the water entrance or any other point exceeds burst speed, (5-6 m per second) that fish would be unable to cross this speed barrier.

While variables such as water temperature and fish length are determinants of swimming speed of fish, CIFRI has assumed that Schizothorax  and Barbodes can swim at 3-5 and 2-4 m per second respectively. They have taken the flow speed of water with head height, and fitted it to the equation for determining the velocity through the orifices in or over the baffles, and they are estimated to be ranging from 2.69 to 2.80 m per second, which they say, ‘permits the fish to cruise through the fish-way comfortably.’

There are some doubts here. Even a short distance of one baffle, or at just the entrance is critical, because if that is unpassable, the entire fish-way is unsuccessful. Further, CIFRI has arrived at burst-speed of fish for this river not by actual studies on specific species, but by inference from studies on fish in other countries. What strikes as doubtful about this basis, is their assumption that all other things being equal, a fish of any species is capable of equal burst speed, provided it is of the same length. This does not match anything one sees as evidence in the occupation of different fish species in different river stretches, nor in their striking speed while feeding competitively.

In order to test whether the fish ladder was ‘working’, CIFRI officials operated the fish pass in March (the beginning of the migration season) for 3 days and then closed the sluice gates to check. They found Schizothorax richardsonii, Garra gotyla and G. lissorhinchus in the top-most pool. They did it again in June and found 8 species in the uppermost pool. While it is clear from this that some fish are making it up the channel right upto the top pool, they have no way of knowing for sure whether they were getting through the 25 cm gap at different draw-down levels.

The critical question here is not just whether some fish are making it up the channel, but which species, how many, and are breeding populations making it up on time? A relevant study cited on the April 2013 issue of the Yale Environment 360, titled ‘Fish and hydropower on the U.S. Atlantic coast: failed fisheries policies from half-way technologies’ by J.Jed Brown and 6 other co-authors (Conservation Letters, Vol 6. Issue 4, p 280-286, July/Aug 2013) is instructive. The discussion by co-author John Waldman is titled ‘Blocked Migration: Fish Ladders on US dams are not effective’, citing this study goes on to say that fishways on rivers in the U.S. Northeast are failing, with less than 3 percent of one key species making it upriver to their spawning grounds.

 Waldman says that “in most major rivers in the U.S., maintaining some semblance of the integrity of migratory fish runs past hydropower dams is dependent upon the fish using ladders and elevators”. They undertook a study of the success – or, rather, failure – of Atlantic salmon, American shad, river herring, and other species in migrating from the sea to their spawning grounds past a gauntlet of dams on three rivers in the northeastern U.S. – the Susquehanna, Connecticut, and Merrimack. Waldman says “what we found was grimmer than we expected. For one species, American shad, less than 3 percent of the fish made it past all the dams in these rivers to their historical spawning reaches.  The sobering aspect of these contemporary studies is that they are based on the insubstantial number of fish today as compared to earlier massive migrations of these species, which numbered in the many millions. For the international community, the record of fish passage on rivers in the northeastern U.S. is a cautionary tale”.

He goes on to say that “hydropower has often been billed as a clean source of renewable energy, and generating electricity without polluting the air or producing greenhouse gases is commendable. But ‘clean’ is in the eye of the beholder, and any claims to being sustainable ignore its multifarious aquatic effects, including blocking fish passage, fragmenting habitat, and undermining a river’s fundamental ecological services.”

What Brown and co-authors found was bleak. One metric used was the percentage of fish passing the first dam that also passed just the second dam. For shad, the numbers were 16 percent on the Merrimack, 4 percent on the Connecticut, and 32 percent on the Susquehanna. But on these rivers, Waldman says, the second dam is only the beginning of the journey, and these rivers have multiple dams blocking access to historical spawning reaches. It’s important to put these results in perspective because they are merely relative to the present paltry numbers of fish that even attempt to migrate up these rivers.

The study says that there are three absolute numbers that matter. One is how many ran annually before the dam was created, the second is the numbers targeted for restoration in fish passage programs, and the third are the numbers that actually show up each year. On all the rivers examined by the study, restoration goals were in the hundreds of thousands of fish – at least one, if not two, orders of magnitude less than historic, pristine runs. Yet run sizes obtained across three decades ranged annually from a high of about 10 percent to, more commonly, 2 percent or less of the stated goals.

There are two significant aspects worth taking note of here. First, the three absolute numbers that matter, as mentioned in the paragraph above. The construction of a fish ladder must come with quantified stated goals, in terms of the number of fish that are required to pass as minimum, to achieve the desired stability of fish populations. This requires an estimate of populations prior to building the dam, and an estimate of the number that migrate unimpeded, as well as specific population dynamics. Fish migrations in large rivers can be in the millions, as already cited here from Brown and Waldman’s study. Here at the Kurichhu, or any other fish-pass in India, population and migration estimates, let alone quantified goals are a far cry.

Secondly, the study clearly illustrates that every subsequent dam upstream has a cumulative  impact on the numbers of fish succeeding upstream, diminishing in orders of magnitude. This brings to the fore the critical importance of considering cumulative impact of multiple projects, despite ‘mitigation measures’, along an entire stream-length, before any clearance is given piece-meal.

While on the design for fish-passes on specific hydro-projects, there are many aspects other than physical passability provided by a fish-pass, that determine its success or failure. Changed flow, turbulence, and volumes can be disorienting for fish leading to serial delays, making it unlikely that the many fish make it to the spawning reaches at the optimal time in the river’s seasonal ecological cycle. The numbers of adults successfully returning downstream past the dams also sacrifice their future spawning potential. The flow out of an operating fish-ladder is often very small compared to the water going into the intake to the turbines, and fish will often choose the larger flow during descent, to their peril. At Kurichhu for example, the flow down the fish ladder is just 0.80 m³ a second, which is a fraction of the flows for the 4.75 m diameter intake of any one of the four 15 MW turbines.

There is also the larger question of flows in a river being regulated by series of dams, and sometimes being too low to provide the necessary cues for hormonal change and migration, puts paid to fish even reaching fish-ladders in the first place.

The study by Brown and colleagues in the US says that despite vast spending on modern technologies, contemporary shad migrations on these rivers are at least three to four orders of magnitude below the original unfettered run sizes, with similar results for salmon and river herring. While dams alone don’t explain these results; overfishing, habitat destruction, and alien species contribute – but there is widespread consensus among fish biologists that dams (such fish-passes notwithstanding) are a primary cause. Surely, a cautionary tale for India.

And here is another cautionary tale for India, where unlike Bhutan, fish are eaten, readily. Thirty-three years ago, standing on the Sutlej Barrage at Ropar in Punjab, I witnessed a strange sight. At the base of the barrage, there was some urgent movement in the cold blue waters of the Sutlej in early spring. Mahseer fish were attempting to migrate up and beyond the 10 meter high barrage. There, right along the buttress of the sloping spillway, one could see a living pyramid of thousands of fish upon fish, slithering up the side of the uni-dimensional triangle against the spillway, barely submerged in the leaking flow from one of the gates, and wriggling on top of and past each other, in a futile effort to make it over the barrage. While this may just have been a collective shoal strategy to get past smaller rapids, it was a death-trap for fish there, against a steep and high barrage. Some other men had already seen this, and I could see them wade up to the desperate and tenuous pyramid in knee deep water below the barrage, and carrying away fish in sack-loads.

Hydro-power projects in India may undertake to construct fish-ladders projected as mitigations measures to obtain environmental clearance, but that does not prevent the staff and others from making the best of the concentration of fish at the base of the fish-ladders and even at un-passable barrages and predating on them. The CIFRI study for the Kurichhu mentions that Indian workers hired by NHPC regularly fished at points of concentration during migration season, nullifying the purpose of the fish-pass. Clearly, the dam authorities will also need to be charged with the responsibility for protection of fish-passes, and other points of concentration even on dams without fish passes.

These are some of the aspects that require to be further investigated about fish-passes in our Indian context, and to be put on the table for discussion and closer scrutiny when mitigation measures are proposed by hydro-power projects.

Editor’s Note from SANDRP:

When the rivers in Himalayas are facing huge impacts of cascade hydropower projects, it is important to look at the role played by organisations like CIFRI ( Central Inland Fisheries Research Institute) which is supposed to be Asia’s “premier facility in the feild of inland fisheries research” CIFRI was hired as a consultant for recommending eflows for Teesta IV HEP in Sikkim and 780 MW Nyamjangchu HEP in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. In the case of Nyamjangchu, CIFRI recommended a flow of 3.5 cumces from the proposed barrage point, which is 14% lower than the lowest flows recorded (extrapolated) for that site. It is highly improbable that even CIFRI’s target species of snow trout will be able to sustain these drastic flow reductions. CIFRI has not raised a voice when multiple dams are being planned without fish ladders or realistic mitigation measures across the country when protecting riverine fish and fisheries is a part of its mandate.

In a strange contradiction, although India’s NHPC has built Kurichhu HEP and CIFRI has designed the fish ladder for a dam that is 55 mts high, the EAC of the MoEF in India unilaterally thinks that fish ladders do not work for dams, even as high as 42 meters, This EAC also includes representative from CIFRI.

Before concluding that fish ladders will or will not work in India, we need extensive studies on this subject for different rivers and projects. Unfortunately, none are being undertaken, in line with our overall apathy towards riverine fish diversity and fisheries. Good, scientific  studies will help in designing ladders which can be useful for species specifically found in Indian rivers, or will conclude that ladders will not work in specific cases, in which case, the irreversible impact of the project will have to be looked at in a perspective beyond ‘mitigation measures’.

The December 2013 – January 2014 edition of SANDRP’s magazine ‘Dams, River and People’  is now available online. This is the 11-12th issue of magazine in its 11th volume.  The contents magazine are mentioned in the list below. Packed with information on water, rivers, dams and environment, this issues covers issues at home in India as well in three other South Asian countries, namely Bhutan, Nepal and water dispute between India and Pakistan. This issues covers The  magazine in pdf format is available here — http://sandrp.in/DRP_Dec_2013_Jan_2014.pdf. Several of the articles are also available in SANDRP’s blog and they can be viewed just by clicking on the name in the list. Enjoy reading.